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MAKING CRIMINAL CODES FUNCTIONAL:
A CODE OF CONDUCT AND





A traditional criminal code performs several functions. It an-
nounces the law's commands to those whose conduct it seeks to influ-
ence. It also defines the rules to be used in deciding whether a
breach of the law's commands will result in criminal liability and, if so,
the grade or degree of liability. In serving the first function, the code
addresses all members of the public. In performing the second func-
tion, it addresses lawyers, judges, jurors, and others who play a role in
the adjudication process.
In part because of these different audiences, the two functions
call for different kinds of documents. To effectively communicate to
the public, the code must be easy to read and understand. It must
give a clear statement, in objective terms if possible, of the conduct
that the law prohibits and under what conditions it is prohibited.
Readability, accessibility, simplicity, and clarity characterize a code
that most effectively articulates and announces the criminal law's rules
of conduct.
The adjudicators, on the other hand, can tolerate greater com-
plexity. Clarity and simplicity are always a virtue, but the judgments
required of adjudicators necessarily limit how simple the adjudication
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an associate at the New Jersey law firm of Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch; and Natasha R.
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rules can be. While the public can be told rather easily and clearly
that "you may not cause bodily injury or death to another person,"'
when a prohibited injury or death does occur, the adjudicators need
rules to determine whether the injurer ought to escape liability be-
cause he or she had no culpability, was insane, believed mistakenly but
reasonably that the force used was necessary for self-defense, or for
any number of other reasons. If liability is appropriate, the adjudica-
tion rules must determine the appropriate degree of liability, taking
account of the actor's level of culpability, the extent of the injury, and
a variety of other mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Many, if
not most, of these liability and grading factors require complex and
sometimes subjective criteria.
The current practice of using a single code to perform both func-
tions means that neither function is performed as well as it could be.2
Is it possible to draft two codes-a code to articulate the rules of con-
duct, written for lay persons, and a code to govern the adjudication
process, written for criminal justice professionals? If one were to pull
out of a current criminal code only those provisions that a lay person
must know in order to remain law-abiding, what would such a docu-
ment contain and what would it look like? If one were to organize a
code to capture the decisional process for criminal adjudication, what
would such a document contain and what would it look like? This
Article attempts to answer these questions. We tentatively conclude
that distinct codes of conduct and of adjudication can be drafted and
can allow the criminal law to perform both functions more efficiently
and successfully.
The possibility of creating separate codes for separate functions is
made feasible in part because each doctrine of criminal law typically
serves one or the other function. For example, to communicate effec-
tively to the members of the public the rules needed to conform their
conduct to the requirements of law, a code need not clearly communi-
cate the subtleties of the insanity defense, the detailed definitions of
culpable states of mind, or the operation of the entrapment doctrine.
That is, a code of conduct and a code of adjudication can be created
by segregating the doctrines of criminal law into one or the other
code according to the function that each doctrine performs.3
1 Appendix A, § 3 (Injury to a Person).
2 See generally Paul H. Robinson, A FunctionalAnalysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv.
857 (1994) [hereinafter, Robinson, Functional Analysis]; Paul H. Robinson, Rues of Conduct
and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 729 (1990) [hereinafter, Robinson, Rues
and Principes].
3 See infra text accompanying note 107. There is no suggestion by this segregation that
the code drafted for adjudicators be kept secret from the public. More on this later.
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This Article outlines how a code of conduct and a code of adjudi-
cation can be drafted, and how taken together the two codes can bet-
ter perform each of the two functions of present criminal codes. Part
II discusses strategies for drafting an effective code of conduct, Part III
for drafting a code of adjudication. Both discussions use examples
from the complete models for a draft code of conduct in Appendix A
and a draft code of adjudication in Appendix B. We do not offer
these codes as refined, ready-to-enact models, but rather as illustra-
tions of the drafting principles that we develop.
II. DRAFTING A CODE OF CONDUCT
How can one create a clear statement for the public of the rules
of conduct, one that is easy to read, understand, and apply in daily
life, even in the situations of anxiety and confusion in which the po-
tential for criminal conduct sometimes arises? We offer five drafting
principles toward that end.
A. ELIMINATE LIABILITY AND GRADING LANGUAGE
Presently, criminal codes include much more than the rules of
conduct, and it is this feature that most impedes communication with
the public. The long and complex rules governing the adjudication
of liability and grading hide the conduct rules. Even if the conduct
rules could be understood, they cannot be found. At under 2,300
words, including headings, the draft code of conduct in Appendix A is
one-fifteenth the length of the Model Penal Code, although it covers
essentially the same material. 4
Consider an example; the Model Penal Code's definition of as-
sault.5 In essence, the Model Penal Code's section 211.1 criminalizes
4 The relevant provisions of the Model Penal Code-Part I (excluding Articles 6 and
7) and Part II-are approximately 35,000 words in length. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Offi-
cial Draft 1985).
5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Assault) provides:
(1) Simple Assault. A person is guilty of assault if he:
(a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury
to another;, or
(b) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bod-
ily injury.
Simple assault is a misdemeanor unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by
mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor.
(2) Aggravated Assault. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:(a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury pur-
posely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life; or(b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another
with a deadly weapon.
Aggravated assault under paragraph (a) is a felony of the second degree; aggravated assault
306 [Vol. 86
MAKING CRIMINAL CODES FUNCTIONAL
causing bodily injury to another. Eliminating the liability and grading
language from the provision leaves a fairly readable and understanda-
ble rule:
3. INJURY TO A PERSON
You may not cause bodily injury or death to another person.
Gone are all culpability requirements, as well as other language defin-
ing grades of assault. Indeed, this simple rule of conduct provides a
substitute not only for the Code's definitions of simple and aggravated
assault,6 but also for the definitions of criminal homicide,7 murder,8
manslaughter,9 negligent homicide, 10 and reckless endangerment."
Together these offense definitions take up some 490 words in the
Model Penal Code, 475 more than the fifteen words of the draft code
of conduct provision quoted above.
Similarly, the Model Penal Code's provisions relating to complic-
ity, solicitation, and conspiracy require 1,600 words. 12 The rule of
conduct they contain is reducible to this:
50. ACTING WITH ANOTHER TowARD COMMISSION OF A CRIME
(COMPLICITY, CONSPIRACY, AND SOLICITATION)
You may not agree with, ask, assist, or encourage another to
commit a crime.
Gone are all culpability requirements, doctrines of mitigation and ag-
gravation, and special defenses, for none of these are needed to tell
persons what this aspect of the law commands of them.
The code of conduct would also eliminate all excuse defenses
and nonexculpatory defenses. Only justification defenses remain, and
then only their objective requirements. To remain law-abiding, peo-
ple do need to know the rules that allow them to use otherwise unlaw-
ful force. However, they do not also need to know, for example, the
conditions that will give rise to a duress excuse or the kind of mistake
under paragraph (b) is a felony of the third degree.
6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Assault).
7 Id. § 210.1 (Criminal Homicide).
8 Id. § 210.2 (Murder).
9 Id. § 210.3 (Manslaughter).
10 Id. § 210.4 (Negligent Homicide).
11 Id. § 211.2 (Recklessly Endangering Another Person). The substitute for reckless
endangerment also requires reference to Appendix A, § 51 (Creating a Prohibited Risk).
12 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06 (Liability for Conduct of Another, Complicity); 5.02
(Criminal Solicitation); 5.03 (Criminal Conspiracy); 5.04 (Incapacity, Irresponsibility or
Immunity of Party to Solicitation and Conspiracy); 5.05 (Grading of Criminal Attempt,
Solicitation and Conspiracy, Mitigation in Cases of Lesser Danger, Multiple Convictions
Barred).
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that will mitigate their level of liability.13
B. CONSOLIDATE OVERLAPPING OFFENSES
The consolidation of overlapping offenses provides a second
means of improving the Code's ability to communicate to the public.
Just as the elimination of liability and grading language focuses the
reader upon the rules of conduct, as discussed in Part II.A., consolida-
tion of overlapping offenses similarly eliminates many unnecessary
words, as well as entire provisions. Many offenses in current codes
prohibit conduct identical to that prohibited by other offenses; the
offenses differ only to distinguish grades of punishment. For exam-
ple, an offender frequently is held liable for the same conduct under
different offenses depending upon whether a prohibited harm actu-
ally results. Thus, reckless endangerment 4 and reckless homicide15
prohibit the same conduct (or at least should prohibit the same con-
duct 16 ), with the latter applicable where the risk created results in
death and the former applicable where it does not. Where the con-
duct results in injury but not death, a third offense applies: assault.
The specific assault offense may vary with the extent of the injury
caused.' 7 In other words, current codes distinguish grades of offenses
both by creating subsections within an offense and by creating sepa-
rate offenses. All of these distinctions can be eliminated by drafting a
code of conduct that has as its purpose only a description of the law's
commands. Such consolidation makes the code more accessible to
the public.
Consolidation is possible for every set of offenses that differ from
one another only in that one prohibits causing a result and another
prohibits engaging in conduct that merely isks the same result.
Model Penal Code section 220.2(1) defines the offense of causing a
catastrophe; section 220.2 (2) defines the separate offense of risking a
catastrophe. The only difference is one of grading: recklessly causing
13 Members of the public may well find some information in the adjudication code
useful. For example, the relative seriousness of offenses as reflected in their grading may
be useful in judging the justification of conduct. The point here is simply that conveying
the basic rules of conduct is an important function that can be improved by keeping the
statement of rules as simple and straightforward as possible. The code of adjudication
ought to remain available to lay persons, as the criminal code is now, so that information
such as the relative grades of offenses will remain as available as it is today. See infra text
accompanying note 107.
14 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (Recklessly Endangering Another Person).
15 Id. § 210.3 (Manslaughter).
16 For discussion of the Model Penal Code's failure to provide a general definition of
criminal risk that governs both offenses, see Robinson, Functional Analysis, supra note 2, at
886-87.
17 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Assault).
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a catastrophe is a third degree felony, while merely risking it, with the
same culpable state of mind, is only a misdemeanor.1 8
A similar proliferation of offenses in present codes occurs where
multiple offenses punish the same conduct at different liability levels
because of different levels of culpability. For example, the Model Pe-
nal Code distinguishes among three homicide offenses-murder,
manslaughter, and negligent homicide-according to the actor's level
of culpability as to causing the result-purposeful or knowing, reck-
less, and negligent, respectively.19
Theft offenses illustrate yet another proliferation of offenses.
Each of several different offenses criminalizes a particular form of tak-
ing, using, or transferring another's property without consent.2 0
Model Penal Code section 223.2(1) criminalizes taking or exercising
control over movable property.2' Section 223.3 prohibits obtaining
property by deception.22 Section 223.4 criminalizes obtaining prop-
erty by extortion.28 Section 223.7 covers theft of services, 24 while sec-
tion 223.8 targets theft by failure to make required disposition of
funds received.25 The rule of conduct for these offenses (and for
property damage offenses) is reducible to the following:
24. DAMAGE TO OR THEFT OF PROPERTY
You may not damage, take, use, dispose of, or transfer an-
other's property without the other's consent. Property is any-
thing of value, including services offered for payment and access
to recorded information.
Proliferation also occurs where offenses combine prohibitions al-
ready contained individually in other offenses. The offense of rob-
bery,26 for example, simply prohibits a combination of theft and
assault. Perhaps such conduct should be graded higher than it would
be if punished separately as a theft and an assault. If this is so, then
the adjudication code should reflect such a policy. But creation of a
18 Id. § 220.2(1)-(2) (Causing or Risking Catastrophe).
19 Id. §§ 210.2 (Murder); 210.3 (Manslaughter); 210.4 (Negligent Homicide).
20 See MODEL PENAL CODE, art. 223 (Theft and Related Offenses).
21 Id. § 223.1(1) (Consolidations of Thefts).
22 Id. § 223.3 (Theft by Deception).
23 Id. § 223.4 (Theft by Extortion).
24 Id. § 223.7 (Theft of Service).
25 Id. § 223.8 (Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Funds Received). The
grading of these offenses in Model Penal Code § 223.1(2) is not tied to the mode of theft
defining each offense, which mightjustify that Code's use of separate offenses, but, rather,
depends primarily on the value of the item stolen. Id. § 223.1(2) (Consolidation of Theft
Offenses; Grading, Provisions Applicable to Theft Generally).
26 Id. § 222.1 (Robbery).
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robbery offense adds nothing to the law's statement of prohibited
conduct; the theft and assault prohibitions already clearly criminalize
the conduct described in the robbery offense.
The same is true of burglary, which combines trespass and at-
tempt to commit another substantive offense, such as theft.2 7 Simi-
larly, arson combines reckless endangerment and criminal mischief.28
All of these combination offenses can be eliminated by a code of con-
duct without loss of coverage.
Beyond providing a shorter, clearer statement of the rules of con-
duct, consolidation of offenses can expose inadvertent loopholes in
offense prohibitions. A set of overly specific, related provisions may
criminalize remarkably similar conduct, yet overlook a few significant
variations. For example, the Illinois Criminal Code contains eleven
separate prostitution-related offenses, criminalizing nearly all forms of
prostitution. Yet, while it criminalizes "touching or fondling of the
sex organs . . . for any money . .. or anything of value,"29 the Code
inexplicably fails to criminalize sexual intercourse for "anything of
value," perhaps because the complexity of so many related provisions
hides the inadvertent omission. A more concisely drafted, generally
descriptive code can readily sidestep such problems.
C. SIMPLIFY JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES
Current justification defenses illustrate the kinds of errors code
drafters commit when they fail to distinguish between the functions of
a code of conduct and a code of adjudication. Current justification
defenses are frequently detailed and complex; the Model Penal
Code's provision on defense of property goes on for 1,035 words.30
The portion that governs use of force for the recapture of property
unlawfully taken, for example, reads as follows:
(1) Use of Force Justifiable for Protection of Property. Subject to the
provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force
upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the ac-
tor believes that such force is immediately necessary:
27 See id. § 221.1 (Burglary) ("A person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or
occupied structure ... with purpose to commit a crime therein, unless ... the actor is
licensed or privileged to enter.").
28 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 220.1 (Arson and Related Offenses); 211.2 (Recklessly
Endangering Another Person); 220.3 (Criminal Mischief). Similarly, § 251.3 (Loitering to
Solicit Deviate Sexual Relations) combines loitering (§ 250.6) and solicitation (§ 5.02). Id.
§§ 251.3 (Loitering to Solicit Deviant Sexual Relations); 5.02 (Criminal Solicitation).
29 720 ILCS 5/11-14 (1995) (emphasis added).
30 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06.
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(b) to effect an entry or re-entry upon land or to retake tan-
gible movable property, provided that the actor believes that he
or the person by whose authority he acts or a person from whom
he or such other person derives title was unlawfully dispossessed
of such land or movable property and is entitled to possession,
and provided, further, that:
(i) the force is used immediately or on fresh pursuit
after such dispossession; or
(ii) the actor believes that the person against whom he
uses force has no claim of right to the possession of the prop-
erty and, in the case of land, the circumstances, as the actor
believes them to be, are of such urgency that it would be an
exceptional hardship to postpone the entry or re-entry until
a court order is obtained.
(3) Limitations on Justifiable Use of Force.
(c) Resistance of Lawful Re-entry orRecaption. The use of force
to prevent an entry or re-entry upon land or the recaption of
movable property is not justifiable under this Section, although
the actor believes that such re-entry or recaption is unlawful, if:
(i) the re-entry or recaption is made by or on behalf of
a person who was actually dispossessed of the property; and
(ii) it is otherwise justifiable under subsection (1) (b) of
this Section.3 '
While such complexity may be tolerable in a code of adjudication, it
borders on the absurd to think that a person who comes upon an-
other who is unlawfully taking his or her property would or could fol-
low these rules, even if he or she had a copy of the rules in hand.
The drafters' failure to understand the natural limitations of a
criminal code creates two problems. First, their efforts to alter peo-
ple's conduct by drafting complex code provisions are doomed to fail.
For example, the drafters may be right that it would be best to have a
person resist the temptation to use force to recapture property taken
by a person acting under a claim of right, as Model Penal Code sec-
tion 3.06(3) (c) (i) provides.3 2 It may be better to have the parties set-
tle their dispute in court than to allow a clash that could escalate into
violence 33 But can the drafters really believe that burying such a spe-
3' Id.
32 Id. § 3.06(3) (c) (i).
33 See id. § 3.06 commentary at 73-74 (1985).
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cial rule among the 1,035 words of the defense of property provision
will cause people unlawfully dispossessed of property to refrain from
using force? One of us regularly teaches the Model Penal Code's de-
fensive force provisions to law students, but would be unable to apply
the complex rules and exceptions of the Code that govern a recapture
situation. How can one think that such statutory pronouncements
can alter the conduct of the average non-law professor? Whenever
criminal code drafters formulate a special rule in the expectation that
it will alter people's conduct, they show their ignorance of their code's
limited accessibility to the average person.
A more serious effect of the Code drafters' ignorance on this
point is the unfairness it creates for individual defendants who come
within the scope of one of these rules. The actor defending his or her
property against an unlawful dispossession, who is unlikely to know
anything about the drafters' special rule barring recapture from one
acting under a "claim of right," will be denied ajustification defense if
he or she violates the rule. Thus, the drafters' erroneous belief that
they can change conduct by manipulating complex statutory rules not
only fails to change conduct, but also creates unfairness by denying a
defense to a person who could not reasonably have been expected to
act in a way other than he or she did. To avoid this unfairness, where
a code of conduct adopts any rule that cannot be simply stated, the
rule ought to correspond to the lay person's intuition of what a just
rule for the situation would provide. This issue is discussed below in
Section E.3 4
The draft code of conduct in Appendix A suggests a formulation
that reduces the Model Penal Code's 1,035 words to the following
thirty-three:
56. DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
You may use reasonable force against a person who is unlaw-
fully threatening property or who has just unlawfully taken prop-
erty, if such force is immediately necessary to defend or take back
the property.
D. USE SIMPLE, ACCESSIBLE LANGUAGE
The previous three drafting principles improve a code's commu-
nicative potential by reducing its complexity and eliminating unneces-
sary language. The use of simple and plain language provides a
different kind of improvement. In other contexts, scholars have
noted the benefits of plain language drafting and careful attention to
34 See infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
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the structure of a code's provisions.3 5 Careful word choice, sentence
structure, and overall organization all serve to improve lay compre-
hension. Several kinds of reformulations are particularly useful.
First, effective plain language drafting calls for short, commonly-
used words.36 Consider Model Penal Code section 240.1, prohibiting
the gaining of an advantage by interfering with the exercise of polit-
ical power:
A person is guilty of bribery, a felony of the third degree, if he
offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, ac-
cepts or agrees to accept from another:
(1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the recipient's
decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise of dis-
cretion as a public servant, party official or voter. ..37
While the term "consideration" may have a clear meaning for lawyers,
the term does not have the same meaning for the lay person.38 A
code of conduct prohibition might read better if phrased like the
following:
45. BRIBERY AND CRIMINAL COMPENSATION
You may not offer or accept any benefit either to influence
the future action of or in return for past action by a public official
or servant, a party official, or a voter, UNLESS such benefit is a
legal fee or salary for such action.
This prohibits the conduct criminalized by the Model Penal Code sec-
tion (and much more39), but replaces the word "consideration" with
the words "influence" and "in return for."
35 See MARK ADLER, CLARrTy FOR LAbelERs: THE USE OF PLAIN ENGLISH IN LEGAL WRIrrING
(1990); MICHELE M. ASPREY, PLAIN LANGUAGE FOR LAWYERS (1991); PICHARD C. WYDICK,
PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (3d ed. 1994); IrvingYounger, In Praise of Simpiity, 62 A.BA
J. 632 (1976).
36 See ADLER, supra note 35, at 62, 75-81; AsPRLu, supra note 85, at 81-97; WVfxci, supra
note 35, at 53-60.
37 MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 (Bribery in Official and Political Matters) (emphasis
added).
38 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 484 (1966) defines consideration
as "observation, contemplation; continuous or deliberate thought .... " The eighth mean-
ing listed is "something given as recompense," but this is not the common understanding
of the term. Id.
39 The draft section also includes the prohibitions of MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 240.6
(Compensating Public Servant for Assisting Private Interests in Relation to Matters Before
Him), 240.7 (Selling Political Endorsement; Special Influence), 241.6 (Tampering with
Witnesses and Informants; Retaliation Against Them), and 224.8 (Commercial Bribery and
Breach of Duty to Act Disinterestedly).
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The offense of prostitution yields another example. The Model
Penal Code prohibition provides:
A person is guilty of prostitution, a petty misdemeanor, if he or
she:
(a) is an inmate of a house of prostitution or otherwise en-
gages in sexual activity as a business .... 40
Just as "consideration" has a meaning for the drafters that differs from
its ordinary usage, so too does "inmate." In current common usage
the term refers to someone incarcerated in a prison rather than to a
resident of a house of prostitution. The draft code of conduct re-
places this language with the following:
34. PROSTITUTION
You may not engage in, support, or profit from any sexual
act that is offered for sale.41
This draft provision also covers the prohibitions contained in Model
Penal Code sections 251.2(1) (b)-(6) (Prostitution and Related Of-
fenses). In this instance, 591 Model Penal Code words are reduced to
eighteen.
The use of shorter sentences similarly increases comprehen-
sion.42 The Model Penal Code, in addition to using technical legal
language, commonly relies on long, multi-clause sentences. Model
Penal Code section 223.5, for example, provides:
A person who comes into control of property of another that he
knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as
to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the
recipient is guilty of theft if, with purpose to deprive the owner
thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the prop-
erty to a person entitled to have it.43
Shorter sentences could convey the same information as this sentence
of sixty-seven words but increase the likelihood of lay comprehension.
The draft code of conduct criminalizes the same conduct as follows:
40 MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.2(1) (a) (Prostitution and Related Offenses) (emphasis
added).
41 A "sexual act" is defined in Appendix A § 35.
42 See AspRsY, supra note 35, at 74-76; WyDicu, supra note 35, at 33-37.
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.5 (Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by
Mistake).
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27. FAILURE TO RETURN LOST OR MISTAKENLY DELIVERED
PROPERTY
You may not keep lost or mistakenly delivered property, UN-
LESS you make a reasonable effort to find its owner and return
the property.
A third clarification technique involves the capitalization of con-
necting words. The quote above illustrates the use of capitalization to
highlight important conditions. The same is useful to highlight con-
necting words that might easily be missed. Some offenses criminalize
conduct only if it satisfies several conditions; others may prohibit any
one of a list of related actions. The significant difference between
such provisions can be brought to the attention of the reader by high-
lighting the connecting words. For example, the draft code of con-
duct provision defining the justified use of force by a parent,
guardian, teacher, or caretaker requires both of two conditions:
62. USE OF FORCE BY PARENT, GUARDIAN, TEACHER, OR
CARETAKER
If you are a parent, guardian, teacher, or caretaker, you may
use reasonable force against a minor or incompetent if:
(a) you are legally responsible for the minor or incompe-
tent's care or supervision,
AND
(b) such force is necessary to safeguard the well-being of the
minor or incompetent.
In contrast, the duty to act to prevent a catastrophe requires action if
either of two conditions is met:
26. DuTY TO PREVENT CATASTROPHE
You must make reasonable efforts to prevent or reduce po-
tentially widespread injury or damage from explosion, fire, flood,
avalanche, collapse of building, release of other harmful or de-
structive force or substance, or any other means, if you:
(a) have an official, contractual, or other legal duty to pre-
vent the injury or damage,
OR
(b) have contributed to creating the danger.
The capitalization of the connecting words (AND and OR) empha-
sizes the relation between the two conditions and is likely to reduce
19961
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misunderstanding. 44
A different kind of reform switches present codes' use of phrases
like "an actor" or "a person" in describing a prohibition to use of the
second person pronoun, "you." If the goal of the code of conduct is
to tell members of the public what each may not do and what each is
obligated to do, what better way to emphasize the point than through
the use of the second person pronoun.45 The law's prohibitions are
not directed to some abstract, nameless, hypothetical person. They
are directed to YOU.
Finally, a code of conduct can be made more comprehensible by
organizing it in a way that helps readers understand how it works. No-
tice that in the Appendix A table of contents Part II collects all offense
conduct, grouped within that Part according to a few basic categories.
(The federal criminal code and some state criminal codes, in contrast,
intersperse offenses with other provisions, organizing all the provi-
sions alphabetically. 46 ) Part III of the draft code of conduct expands
each of the basic offenses by adding general prohibitions against at-
tempting, assisting, or risking any of the offenses in Part II. Part IV
summarizes the special justifying circumstances in which a person may
commit one of the offenses otherwise prohibited, again, grouping the
justifications into a few basic categories. This organization not only
makes it easy to see the practical connection between similarly
grouped provisions, but it also allows the reader to better understand
the functional differences between each of the types of provisions.
E. TRACK COMMUNITY VIEWS WHERE POSSIBLE
A final reform that can increase a code of conduct's effectiveness
concerns not its form but its content. Behavioral science research sug-
gests that people can better understand rules that mirror their own
intuitive judgments about just rules for assessing liability. For exam-
ple, one study ofjuror comprehension of legal instructions gave both
true-false and open-ended questions about legal rules to jurors who
had been given legal jury instructions and to jurors who had not.47
The study hypothesized that superior performance by the instructed
jurors, if any, would indicate the extent to which the instructions were
understood. The study, in analyzing the true-false responses, found
44 See AsPREY, supra note 35, at 108-09; W=tcit, supra note 35, at 46-47.
45 See WVficK, supra note 35, at 69.
46 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 31 (aircraft) to 2521 (wiretapping) (1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-
401 (abandonment) to 18-7207 (weights and measures) (1987).
47 Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Juy Instruc-
tions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH.J.L. REF.
401, 406, 409-10 (1990).
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that for 63.6% of the questions, jury instructions had no statistically
significant effect in increasing juror comprehension of the law or it
actually decreased juror comprehension. 48 Other studies confirm the
poor performance ofjury instructions in conveying legal principles to
lay persons.49 The reasons for this include many of the reasons noted
above in explaining the weakness of current criminal codes in effec-
tively communicating the rules of conduct.
One interesting and potentially helpful finding of the jury in-
struction work is that, on issues on which the uninstructed jurors did
relatively well, the instructed jurors tended to do better,50 presumably
because the legal instructions built upon and articulated the lay ju-
rors' existing intuition of what a just rule would be.5 ' Perhaps this
occurs because the instruction only identifies or reminds the juror of
the concept; the juror's prior knowledge provides the level of under-
standing that other instructions by themselves seem unable to pro-
vide.5 2 In any case, these findings suggest that a similar increase in
comprehension of a code of conduct may result from having it mirror
community views.
Beyond the issue of comprehension, a code of conduct can in-
spire greater compliance if, in the public's view, it is known to de-
scribe conduct that the public sees as wrongful. In other words, the
code's credibility as an accurate statement of what is wrongful conduct
can enhance its effectiveness; its lack of credibility can undercut com-
pliance.53 For example, assume a code still criminalizes consensual
48 Id. at 425. In another study using similar methodology, instructed jurors had at best
a six percent greater success rate than uninstructedjurors in correctly assessing the defend-
ant's liability in a controlled test case. Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward CriminalJury
Instructions thatjurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRIm L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 205-06 (1984).
49 See generally Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant, 68 S. CAL. L REv. 159,
170-72 nn.46-60 (1994) (summarizing studies on effectiveness ofjury instructions).
50 Kramer & Koenig, supra note 47, at 421,424. One issue was voluntary manslaughter,
where 89.3% of instructed jurors correctly answered the questions on the issue as com-
pared to 67.6% of the uninstructed jurors. The second issue was whether second degree
criminal sexual conduct always involves injury and penetration, where all instructed jurors
correctly answered the questions on the issue, as compared to 64.4% of the uninstructed
jurors. Id.
51 Id. at 430. In other words, when ajuror's preconceived notions are congruent with
instructions, both uninstructed and instruction-benefited comprehension levels are quite
high. Id. See also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, LAW & CoNTFMP.
PROBS. 205, 220-21 (Autumn 1989).
52 It would be useful to have a further study on the change of both comprehension and
nullification rates as instructions are more or less divergent from community views. Of
course, this kind of research first requires research into the community's views on the
issues to which the test instructions apply. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M.
DARLu, JusrncF LAmBiLrry AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995)
[hereinafter ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LDALur, AND BLAME].
53 See generaly ROBINSON & DARLEY, JuSTIcE, LIABiLrry, AND BLAME, supra note 52, at 6-7;
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sexual intercourse between unmarried persons, so-called "fornica-
tion." In our present society, that provision is likely to be ignored.
But more than that, the inclusion of such a provision may suggest to
many people that the code drafters lack reliable judgment about what
is wrongful conduct. That lack of credibility is likely to lead some to
disregard the code in marginal cases because of a belief that the code
is "behind-the-times," excessively detailed, or simply erroneous. Pre-
sumably all will agree that rape, murder, and mayhem are wrong. But
in less obvious cases, such as criminalization of the failure to return
lost or stolen property,54 the authority with which the code speaks and
its earned moral credibility may well influence the rate of
compliance. 55
III. DRAFTING A CODE OF ADJUDICATION
How can one best draft a code to clearly articulate the sometimes
subtle distinctions needed in the often complex adjudication decision
of not only whether, but also how much, liability ought to be im-
posed? We suggest five drafting principles.
A. ADOPT A CODE STRUCTURE THAT MATCHES THE ANALYTIC PROCESS
Whether the adjudicator is a prosecutor deciding whether and
what to charge, a defense counsel giving advice on a proposed plea
agreement, a judge writing jury instructions, or a jury deliberating on
a verdict, the process of assessing liability has several logical steps. By
organizing a code of adjudication around that analytic process, the
code can increase the chances that the adjudicator will understand
and follow that process.
The analytic process properly follows three questions:
1. Has the defendant violated the rules of conduct?
2. If so, is the violation sufficiently blameworthy that criminal
liability ought to attach?
3. If so, how much liability should be imposed?
While most other codes address these questions without any logi-
Paul H. Robinson, A Failure of Moral Conviction?, PUB. INTEREST 40, 44-46 (Fall 1994).
54 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.5 (Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mis-
take). Another example of marginal criminalization is the offense of "refraining from re-
porting . . . the . . . suspected commission of any offense" in exchange for any
compensation. Id. § 242.5 (Compounding).
55 The draft code of conduct in Appendix A generally does not reflect community
views, but rather tracks the prohibitions contained in the Model Penal Code. Reforming
the rules of conduct to reflect community views would require empirical research beyond
that which is presently available to determine those views.
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cal structure or organization, the code of adjudication in Appendix B
is explicitly organized around these questions. The process begins by
comparing the defendant's conduct to that prohibited by the code of
conduct, the same code that has been available to the defendant and
all members of the public. Did the defendant's conduct violate the
code? While other codes undoubtedly ask these questions, the inquir-
ies are buried among questions about blameworthiness and grading.
SECTION 100. VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT
A person violates the Code of Conduct, for the purposes of
this Code of Adjudication, if the person violates a prohibition or
duty in Part II of the Code of Conduct and does not have ajustifi-
cation for such violation under Part IV of that Code.
A few additional provisions may be needed to make this determina-
tion with precision, provisions that are not necessary in the code of
conduct itself, such as provisions giving more detailed explanations of
what constitutes causation, attempt, conspiracy, solicitation, prohib-
ited risk creation, and consent.56
Once it is clear that the code of conduct was violated, the inquiry
shifts to whether the violation was blameworthy. Here the relevant
inquiries include whether the defendant acted with the required mini-
mum culpable state of mind,57 whether the defendant is accountable
for the offense conduct performed by another,58 whether the defend-
ant ought to be excused for his culpable conduct because of insanity,
immaturity, duress, or some other excusing condition,59 and whether,
despite his blameworthiness, the defendant is entitled to a
nonexculpatory defense such as the statute of limitations or diplo-
matic immunity.6 0
If it is determined that liability is appropriate, the inquiry shifts to
grading the violation. Here the adjudication code must take account
of such issues as the seriousness of the offense harm or evil,61 whether
the offense harm or evil actually occurred,62 the offender's level of
56 Appendix B §§ 110 (Causation Defined); 111 (Requirements for Violation of Code
of Conduct Section 49 (Attempting Commission of a Crime)); 112 (Requirements for Vio-
lation of Code of Conduct Section 50 (Acting with Another Toward Commission of a
Crime)); 113 (Requirements for Violation of Code of Conduct Section 51 (Creating a Pro-
hibited Risk)), 114 (Consent Defense).
57 See id. § 200 (Minimum Culpability Required).
58 See id. § 212 (Accountability for Conduct of Another).
59 See id. arL 22 (Excuses).
60 See id. art. 23 (Nonexculpatory Defenses).
61 Id. § 304 (Base Grade).
62 Id. § 304(49) (reduction in grade where harm or evil of offense has not occurred).
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culpability, 63 the extent of the offender's impaired capacity to avoid
the offense, if any,64 and, if the offender is an accomplice, the extent
of the assistance he or she provided.65 The mechanism used by the
draft code of adjudication to take account of this wide range of factors
sets a base grade for each violation described in the draft code of con-
duct, depending upon the seriousness of the offense harm or evil,66
and then adjusts that base grade up or down according to the pres-
ence of various aggravating or mitigating factors.67 Current codes in-
clude these inquiries in specific offense definitions. The adverse
effect that this has on clarity is discussed below in Part II.C.
The end result of this process of adjustments to the base grade is
a grading classification like that generated by current criminal codes,
but one that takes account of many more factors with greater sophisti-
cation and less complexity. Note that the draft adjudication code in
Appendix B takes less than 5,300 words. Even when added to the
2,300 words of the draft conduct code, the two codes together are still
approximately one-fifth the length of the comparable provisions of
the Model Penal Code.68 Although it is shorter, the draft adjudication
code takes account of relevant factors that the Model Penal Code does
not. The Model Penal Code does not take account of, for example,
such factors as the extent of participation by an accomplice, 69 a de-
fendant's partial disability, 70 or a defendant's selection of victim be-
cause of certain victim characteristics. 71
63 Id. § 310 (Adjustment for Greater Culpability).
64 Id. § 313 (Adjustment for Partial Disability).
65 Id. § 311 (Adjustment According to Extent of Participation in Assisting an Offense by
Another).
66 Id. § 304 (Base Grade). Though the Model Penal Code served as a general guide for
the assignment of base grades, we were obliged to refine the Code's grading judgments
because the draft adjudication code uses 14 grading categories (eight grades of felony, five
grades of misdemeanor, and one grade of petty misdemeanor) in place of the Model Penal
Code's five categories (three grades of felony, one grade of misdemeanor, and one grade
of petty misdemeanor). Modem state codes commonly use eight or more categories. See,
e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 55.05 (McKinney 1987); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.03-.04 (West
1994). The draft code of adjudication uses more categories than usual to allow smaller
adjustments to grade.
67 Appendix B, art. 31 (Adjustments to Base Grade). This scheme is similar to that
used in the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines and described in Paul H.
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 Tux. L. REv. 1 (1987).
68 The length of the Model Penal Code's relevant provisions is approximately 35,000
words. See supra note 4.
69 Appendix B § 311 (Adjustment According to Extent of Participation in Assisting an
Offense by Another).
70 Id. § 313 (Adjustment for Partial Disability).
71 Id. § 314 (Adjustment for Selection of Victim). Nor does the Model Penal Code
provide a system of special verdict forms. See id. App. B, art. 41 (verdict forms).
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B. INCLUDE ALL ARTICUIABLE RULES RELEVANT TO ADJUDICATION
The most useful code of adjudication will include all rules rele-
vant to the liability decision, and as many rules relevant to the grading
decision as is feasible. Relying upon common law rules or giving the
judiciary authority to create and define liability rules through case law
is not an adequate substitute for codification. Comprehensiveness in
a code has several important benefits.
First, comprehensiveness helps avoid inappropriate results.
Judges cannot, in every case, be as effective as a legislature or a crimi-
nal code drafting commission in properly formulating doctrines that
will work together as do the provisions of a comprehensive code. The
failure to create or to properly formulate a defense, for example, can
result in liability for an actor who deserves to be exculpated. It is un-
realistic to expect that a single judge in a single case can more prop-
erly formulate a defense than a legislative drafting committee.
Second, an uncodified rule is more likely to be applied differently
in similar cases than a codified rule. The criteria of the latter are
fixed, explicit, and easily available to all officials at each stage in the
process. For example, assume a person seriously injures another in
the course of a high school football game. Can the injured party insist
that the injurer be prosecuted for aggravated assault? In ajurisdiction
that has no codified consent defense, as many do not,72 the issue may
be left to the discretion of the prosecutor or the judge, to be decided
according to whether he or she thinks there should be a consent de-
fense in such a situation. A sports hater, who sees high school sports
as a dangerous and irresponsible activity, might come to a different
conclusion than a fan of the local team.
The problem is not a hypothetical one. In addition to consent,73
provisions that are frequently missing from current criminal codes,
even recently reformed codes, include such basic rules as those gov-
erning the requirements of causation,7 4 mistake or ignorance of law
or fact,-5 and customary license and de minimis infractions.76
C. USE GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHENEVER POSSIBLE
A code of adjudication can benefit from being made shorter and
72 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering 1994); GA CODE ANN. fit. 16 (1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 14 (1994).
73 See supra note 72.
74 See, e.g., ILL. REV'. STAT. ch. 38 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 (1993); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. LXII (1993).
75 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWs tit. 11 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 16 (1992); Wvo. STAT. tit. 6
(1994).
76 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. tit. XLVI (1993); N.Y. PENAL LAw (Consol. 1992); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. tit. 9-9A (West 1992).
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more streamlined, just as Part I showed that a code of conduct could
so benefit. 77 The greatest benefits are achieved through the use of
general rules that will apply to all offenses without having to repeat
the rule in each specific offense. The culpability required for criminal
liability provides a good example. Current codes typically include a
statement of culpability requirements in each offense definition, but
the functions of culpability requirements suggest that a few general
principles can be substituted.
A first principle suggests that criminal liability ought not be im-
posed in the absence of some minimum level of culpability as to each
offense element. This function of culpability requirements can be
served by a general rule like the following:
SECTION 200. MINIMUM CULPABILITY REQUIRED
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is not crim-
inal unless the actor is at least reckless as to each element of the
violation as described in the Code of Conduct ....
The general rule must be tempered:
... except that negligence is the minimum culpability required:
(a) for a violation of the prohibition against causing the
death of another person under Code of Conduct Section 3 (In-
jury to a Person); and
(b) as to the age of the victim for a violation of Code of Con-
duct Section 14(b) or (c) (Criminal Sexual Contact).78
A jurisdiction might want additional exceptions; these are the two
most common in current codes. The point is, the function of culpa-
bility requirements in setting a minimum condition of liability is more
clearly and easily served when articulated as a general rule.
For some offenses, especially inchoate offenses, code drafters may
wish to add a more demanding culpability requirement. 79 This too
can be provided by special mention within the general provision:
(2) In addition to the culpability requirements of Subsec-
tion (1), to be liable for a violation of:
(a) Code of Conduct Section 49 (Attempting Commission
of a Crime), the actor must have the purpose to engage in the
conduct that would constitute the violation; and
77 See supra part IA-D.
78 Appendix B, § 200 (Minimum Culpability Required).
79 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06(3) (a), 5.01(1) (a)-(c), 5.02(1), 5.03(1).
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(b) Code of Conduct Section 50 (Acting with Another To-
ward Commission of a Crime (Complicity, Conspiracy and Solici-
tation)), the actor must have the purpose to facilitate the conduct
constituting the violation.80
Culpability requirements perform a second function: they in-
crease the grade of liability where the offender has committed the
offense with a higher level of culpability than the required minimum.
In homicide, for example, the grade of a killing varies according to
the actor's culpability as to causing the death. But a general principle
can also govern this function. In the draft code of adjudication, this is
done through the use of a grading table.81 The base grade for each
violation assumes the actor has only the minimum culpability required
for liability. If greater liability is present, the grade of the violation
increases according to the following general principle of adjustment:
SECTION 310. ADJUSTMENT FOR GREATER CULPABILITY
(1) The grade of an offense increases:
(a) two grades if the actor is purposeful as to the core ele-
ments, and
(b) one grade if the actor is knowing as to the core
elements.
(2) Definitions. For the purposes of this Section:
(a) The "core elements" are those facts that establish the vi-
olation in the Code of Conduct and its grade in Section 304
(Base Grade).
(b) "Purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently"
are defined in Section 401 (Definitions).
If special culpability grading distinctions are needed for a particular
offense, they need only be noted in the table.82
This approach allows differences in culpability levels to be easily
taken into account in all cases. While few people would disagree with
the general principle that greater culpability ought to increase liabil-
ity,8 3 current codes only occasionally alter liability accordingly. The
homicide offenses do this, as noted above, as does arson.84 But most
offenses do not, including such important offenses as statutory rape85
80 Appendix B § 200 (Minimum Culpability Required).
81 1I § 304 (Base Grade).
82 Note, for example, that reckless and negligent homicide are given special treatment
in the grading table. See Appendix B, § 304(3) (a)-(b) (Base Grade).
83 ROBINSON & DARLEY, JUSTICE, LAamity, AND BLAME, supra note 52, at 169-81.
84 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 (Arson and Related Offenses).
85 Id. § 213.3(1) (a) (Corruption of Minors and Seduction).
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and theft.88 For example, negligence as to a sexual partner being un-
derage may be adequate for liability, but it seems clear that greater
blameworthiness ought to attach when the actor knows that the part-
ner is underage. Modem codes typically make no grading distinction
between these two cases.87
The practice of ignoring culpability differences may reflect the
overwhelming complexity of such a task given the structure of current
codes. Recognizing culpability differences through the creation of
separate offenses or sub-offenses-the approach of current codes-
dramatically multiplies the number of offenses in a code. In contrast,
with a general adjustment like the one quoted above, no such prolifer-
ation of offenses is needed.
Other general principles in Appendix B similarly provide more
sophisticated grading to take account of other relevant factors without
a proliferation of offenses. For example, if an actor does not receive a
full excuse defense but nevertheless may deserve some mitigation be-
cause of a substantial impairment of functioning, the following provi-
sion guides adjudicators:
SECTION 313. ADJUSTMENT FOR PARTIAL DISABILITY
The grade of the actor's offense decreases one grade if, at
the time of the conduct constituting the offense, the actor suffers
a substantial impairment of cognitive or control function, as de-
fined in a provision in Article 22, but to a degree insufficient to
merit a complete excuse.
Rather than creating a mitigation within each excuse defense, this
general adjustment provides a set of parallel mitigations, piggybacking
on the excuse criteria of each defense in Article 22. Other general
adjustments take account of the extent of contribution by an accom-
plice, a choice of victim that aggravates the seriousness of the offense,
and ineffective renunciation by an actor.88
D. USE PARALLEL LANGUAGE IN CONCEPTUALLY ANALOGOUS
PROVISIONS
The previous subsection discusses the drafting advantages of us-
ing general principles when possible, rather than introducing a dis-
tinct rule for each factual context. An example is the use of a general
86 See id. § 223.2 (Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition).
87 See, e.g., id. § 213.3(1)(a) (Corruption of Minors and Seduction).
88 Appendix B, §§ 311 (Adjustment According to Extent of Participation in Assisting an
Offense by Another); 312 (Adjustment for Ineffective Renunciation of Attempt, Conspir-
acy, or Solicitation); 314 (Adjustment for Selection of Victim).
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principle of adjustment for culpability level rather than the practice of
modem codes of defining special culpability requirements for each
offense. Such a tendency to splinter a single conceptual issue into a
variety of context-specific rules creates difficulties beyond drafting.
Such fracturing also invites inconsistent treatment within the different
contexts. That is, conceptually parallel concepts are actually treated
differently, not only in drafting, but in substance as well. In addition
to hindering clarity, this disparate treatment also results in unfairness.
For example, the Model Penal Code bars an intoxication excuse
for any offense if the actor was negligent in bringing about the excus-
ing condition, that is, in becoming intoxicated.8 9 In contrast, in the
context of duress the actor's negligence only bars the defense for of-
fenses of negligence; an actor must be at least reckless to lose the de-
fense when charged with an offense of recklessness, knowledge, or
purpose. 90 In yet another variation, in the context of the lesser evils
defense, an actor who is negligent in bringing about the justifying cir-
cumstances will lose the defense when charged with an offense of neg-
ligence, but recklessness in bringing about the defense conditions will
bar the defense only for offenses of recklessness. 91 In still other in-
stances, the Code gives no guidance on how to handle an actor's cul-
pability in causing the defense conditions. This is the case, for
example, for a defense for conduct performed under hypnosis.92 Yet,
there is no apparent reason for these different approaches to the
problem of culpability in causing the conditions of one's defense.
One can only guess that the drafters' penchant for context-specific
rules blinded them to the conceptual similarity of the issues.93
The draft adjudication code deals with the problem in the follow-
ing provision:
SECTION 240. CAUSING THE CONDITIONS OF ONE'S OWN JUSTIFICA-
TION OR EXCUSE DEFENSE
(1) When an actor causes the conditions that give rise to a
justification under Part IV of the Code of Conduct or to an ex-
cuse under Article 22 of the Code of Adjudication, the actor gains
the benefit of the defense despite his or her conduct in causing
the defense conditions, but
89 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4), (5) (b) (Intoxication).
90 Id. § 2.09(2) (Duress).
91 Id. § 3.02(2) (Justification Generally: Choice of Evils).
92 See id. § 2.01 (Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of Liability, Posses-
sion as an Act).
93 For a general discussion of the inconsistent treatment of causing the conditions of
different defenses, see Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A
Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REv. 1, 1-27 (1985).
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(2) the actor may be held liable for the violation of the
Code of Conduct based upon his or her conduct in causing the
defense conditions if, at the time of causing those conditions, the
actor has the culpability as to bringing about the violation that is
required by Section 200 (Minimum Culpability Required).
(3) As provided by Section 310 (Adjustment for Greater Cul-
pability), the grade of liability for causing the defense conditions
under Subsection (2) increases if the actor was knowing or pur-
poseful as to causing the violation.
(4) Defense to Liability for Causing the Conditions of One's Own
Defense. An actor may have a justification or excuse defense to
liability under Subsection (2) for his or her conduct in causing
the defense conditions.
A similar problem arises from the drafters' failure to see the con-
ceptual similarity among excuses. The insanity and involuntary intoxi-
cation excuses use parallel language that makes clear that having the
required disability-mental illness or involuntary intoxication-is not,
in itself, enough to merit an excuse. The actor must show, in addi-
tion, that the disability caused a substantial impairment of function-
ing, such that the actor lacked "substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law."94 Yet, in the context of
other excuses, such as hypnotism and somnambulism, the Code fails
to impose such a dysfunction requirement.95 There is no dispute that
hypnosis and somnambulism may create a wide variety of degrees of
dysfunction, some very debilitating, some not.96 Yet the Code's provi-
sions give a defense without any inquiry into the degree of dysfunction
present in a given case. Under the Code's defense formulation, hyp-
nosis or somnambulism will provide a complete defense to an actor
even if the condition did not cause a lack of "substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."97 The draft adju-
dication code collects all excuses in Article 22 and uses parallel re-
94 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility); see
also id. at § 2.08(4) (Intoxication).
95 See id. § 2.01(1), (2) (b)-(c) (Requirement of Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of Lia-
bility; Possession as an Act).
96 See Robinson, Functional Analysis, supra note 2, at 896-901.
97 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility). For
a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Robinson, Functional Analysis, supra note 2,
at 896-901; see also Robinson, Rules and Principles, supra note 2, at 762-63 (discussing similar
problems with Model Penal Code treatment of immaturity defense).
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quirements for each.9 8
E. PROVIDE JURY VERDICTS THAT MAKE CLEAR THEIR MEANING
One final proposal tries to solve the problem of ambiguous jury
acquittals and their destructive effect on criminal justice. First we will
explain the problem, then explain how a properly organized adjudica-
tion code can avoid the problem.
A verdict of "not guilty" under the present system may mean
either: (1) that the actor's conduct in the case did notviolate the rules
of conduct, or (2) that the actor's conduct did violate the rules of
conduct but that he or she is entitled to a culpability, excuse, or
nonexculpatory defense. Thus, any acquittal might be understood
either to approve or to disapprove of the actor's conduct, and that
ambiguity prevents trial verdicts from educating the public about the
commands of the criminal law. Indeed, the ambiguous verdicts can
affirmatively confuse a rule of conduct that otherwise would have
been clear.
A contemporary example of this confusion is the state court ac-
quittals of the officers tried in the beating of Rodney King. Many peo-
ple found the acquittals outrageous because they seemed to condone
the use of excessive and unnecessary force. 99 But the issues at trial
98 Cases of hypnotism and somnambulism are dealt with under the following excuse
defense:
SECrION 225. DisABiLTrry EXCUSE: IMPAIRED CONSCIOUSNESS
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if, at the time of the con-
duct constituting the violation, the actor
(a) is in a state of impaired consciousness, and
(b) by reason of such impaired consciousness, lacks substantial capacity to:
(i) appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or
(ii) conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) "State of Impaired Consciousness" Defined For the purposes of Subsection (1) (a), a
"state of impaired consciousness" means a disturbance of consciousness resulting from
a physiologically confirmable state or condition not specifically recognized or rejected
as a basis for exculpation under any other Section included in this Article.
(3) Presumed Impaired Consciousness. An actor who is unconscious, asleep, or under
hypnosis is presumed to be in a state of impaired consciousness as required by Subsec-
tion (1) (a).
Appendix B, § 225.
99 "[The verdict] sends out a message that whatever you saw on that tape was reason-
able conduct." Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Terry White, reported in Seth Mydans,
ThePolire Verdit N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 30, 1992, atAl. Mr. White was the prosecutor in the case.
Id. "[The verdict] tells me that police can do what they want .... Everyone in the world
saw that man get whipped and I don't know what the jury was seeing." David Green, a 32-
year-old northeast Washington construction worker, reported in Sue Anne Pressley, Case
Casts Long Shadow, WASH. POST, May 1, 1992, at Al, A30. "What does it take to prove
they're guilty? They're saying, 'So what if you videotape me, I still can beat you up.'" Hilda
Whittington, a Chicago African-American nutritionist, reported in Isabel Wilkerson, Riots in
Los Angeles, N.Y. TiMES, May 1, 1992, at A23. "[It is] an outrage that our system can't pun-
ish those-particularly police officers-who use the power and majesty of the state to beat
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went beyond the propriety of the conduct; the trial also focused on
the blameworthiness of the officers, including an examination of the
danger the officers felt, the confusion and uncertainty of the situation
from the officers' perspective, the emotion generated by the preced-
ing high-speed chase, and the training the officers had received for
dealing with such a situation. Thus, the jury acquittal may well have
been based upon a finding of insufficient blameworthiness rather
than an approval of the conduct. 00
Upon hearing the verdicts, different people came to different
conclusions about the jury's intent in voting to acquit. This conflict
arises in part because the simple verdict of "not guilty" fails to tell the
whole story in a most important respect. The jurors could have voted
not guilty because, while they disapproved of the conduct, they did not
think the officers were sufficiently blameworthy to merit criminal con-
viction. Yet, people could reasonably interpret the verdict as an ap-
proval of the officers' conduct, an outrageous outcome to most.
What is needed is a verdict system that distinguishes "no viola-
tion" acquittals from "blameless violation" acquittals. With proper or-
ganization, a code of adjudication can easily do this. Recall from the
first drafting principle for an adjudication code-"Adopt a Code
Structure That Matches the Analytic Process"-that the draft code of
adjudication in Appendix B considers separately the questions of
whether the defendant has violated a rule of conduct and whether
that violation is blameworthy. A code that segregates these questions
may then offer alternative verdicts of "no violation" or "blameless vio-
lation," depending upon the code provision giving rise to the
acquittal.
The structure of the draft code of conduct in Appendix A has
some man senseless." Jerry Brown, former Governor of California, reported in William Rasp-
berry, Where's the Outrage From White America?, WASH. Posr, May 1, 1992, at A27.
100 "In the words of defense attorney Michael Stone, their goal was to persuade jurors to
view the incident 'not through the eye of the camera but through the eyes of the police
officers'.... On the night in question ... [the officers] confronted a 250-pound man who
they believed-wrongly-to be intoxicated with the drug PCP, said to endow users with
'superhuman strength.'" Leef Smith, Jury Was Asked to See Events as Police Did; Defense De-
picted Officers in Urban Jungk WASH. Posr, Apr. 30, 1992, at A25. After hearing the evi-
dence at trial, one juror explained the verdict this way: "At one point, King lunged at and
connected with Officer Powell. The cops were simply doing what they'd been instructed to
do. They were afraid he was going to run or even attack them. He had not been searched,
so they didn't know if he had a weapon. He kept going for his pants, so they thought he
might be reaching for a gun .... I have no regrets about the verdict. I'll sleep well to-
night." The Juy's View, WASH. PosT, May 1, 1992, atA33. Anotherjuror explained: "[King]
'refused to get out of the car ... so the police department had no alternative. He was
obviously a dangerous person, massive size and threatening actions .... They're police-
men. They're not angels. They're out there to do a lowdown dirtyjob. Would you want
your husband doing it, or your son or your father?'" Smith, supra, at A26.
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other similar benefits: it allows jury verdicts to educate the public by
distinguishing "no violation" acquittals from 'justified violation" ac-
quittals. A "no violation" acquittal confirms that the conduct at issue
is not prohibited by the code of conduct and can lawfully be per-
formed by others without any special justification. A 'Justified viola-
tion" acquittal sends the opposite message about the conduct at issue:
it is normally prohibited by the code of conduct and cannot lawfully
be performed by others unless special justifying circumstances exist.
Assume, for example, that a bus passenger is running through
the bus distracting the driver, impairing her view of the road, and
endangering the vehicle and its passengers. Despite requests, the pas-
senger refuses to sit down or to leave the bus. The driver then uses
force to eject the passenger, causing him to twist his ankle. The driver
has violated Section 3 of the draft code of conduct:
3. INJURY TO A PERSON
You may not cause bodily injury or death to another person.
However, because the driver also satisfies the requirements of Section
64, she receives a justification defense:
64. USE OF FORCE BY OPERATOR OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
If you are responsible for the maintenance of safety, control,
or order aboard a vehicle, vessel, train, or aircraft, you may use
reasonable force if it is necessary to maintain such safety, control,
or order.
An acquittal by verdict of 'Justified violation" under Section 64 reaf-
firms that causing bodily injury to another person is not permitted,
unless special triggering conditions and force limitations are satisfied
(such as the justification provision authorizing a bus driver to respond
to the endangerment of her vehicle with the use of non-deadly
force' 01).
Finally, the structure of the draft code of adjudication also allows
the system to distinguish between excused conduct and conduct that
remains blameworthy but is not punishable. For example, a blame-
worthy offender may escape liability because of diplomatic immunity,
former prosecution, governmental immunity, incompetency, expira-
tion of the period of limitation for commencement of the prosecu-
tion, or entrapment.10 2 Because such nonexculpatory defenses are
101 The use of deadly force has additional requirements beyond those in the quoted
Section 64. See Appendix A § 52 (Use of Deadly Defensive Force).
102 SeeAppendix B, art 23 (Nonexculpatory Defenses).
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collected in one article of the draft code of adjudication, an acquittal
based on such a defense is distinguishable from one based on one of
the excuse defenses, which are collected in a different article of the
code.
This distinction between exculpatory and nonexculpatory acquit-
tals should improve the system's credibility. A nonexculpatory acquit-
tal rendered as a simple "not guilty" may be misperceived by some as a
conclusion by the system that the offender is blameless, a conclusion
that may lead some to believe the system has bad judgment on matters
of blameworthiness. That poor credibility can reduce the system's
power to gain compliance. 10 3 By making clear that such acquittals do
not exculpate the offender, but rather result because the offender
simply is not punishable, the system protects its credibility.
Consider, for example, a person who steals an automobile be-
longing to another. The conduct is a violation of the code of conduct:
24. DAMAGE TO OR THEFT OF PROPERTY
You may not damage, take, use, dispose of, or transfer an-
other's property without the other's consent....
Assume, however, that the actor is the member of the staff of a foreign
embassy. Pursuant to the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, the per-
son is not subject to prosecution. 10 4
SECTION 232. DIPLOMATIc IMMUNITY
An actor may not be prosecuted for a violation of the Code
of Conduct if he or she has been granted immunity from prose-
cution pursuant to the procedures of the Diplomatic Relations
Act of 1978.
By making clear that the actor's acquittal arises from a defense in Sec-
tion 232 rather than from a failure to violate Section 24, the special
verdict form'0 5 reaffirms rather than undercuts the prohibition
against theft. It also protects the system's credibility by explaining the
reason for the acquittal of what will seem to the lay person to be con-
demnable conduct.
These kinds of distinctions among acquittal verdicts are possible
because of the general organization of the draft codes:
103 See supra text accompanying note 55.
104 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254a-ee (1988).
105 Appendix B, § 413 (Verdict Form: Not Punishable).
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A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT
Part I. ...
Part II. Specific Crimes: Prohibited and Required
Conduct
Part III. General Prohibitions
Part IV. Justified Violations of the Criminal Law
A DRAFT CODE OF AiDJUDICATION
Part I. Violation of Code of Conduct
Part II. Liability Assessment
Article 20. Minimum Requirements for Liability
Article 22. Excuses
Article 23. Nonexculpatory Defenses
Part III. Grading
By mirroring this organization, verdicts effectively convey their in-
tended meaning. A verdict system like the following would permit
such communication:
SECTION 410. VERDICT FoRM: -No VIOLATION OF PROHIBITIONS OR
DUTIES
If the trier of fact finds no violation of the prohibitions or
duties described in Parts II and III of the Code of Conduct, then
the verdict shall be "No Violation."
SECTION 411. VERDICr FoRM: JUSTIFIED VIOLATION OF PROHIBI-
TION OR DUTY
If the trier of fact finds that the actor's conduct constitutes a
violation of a prohibition or duty under Parts II or III of the Code
of Conduct, but finds that the violation is justified under Part IV
of the Code of Conduct, then the verdict shall be 'Justified
Violation."
SECTION 412. VERDICT FoRM: BLAMELESs VIOLATION
If the trier of fact finds that the actor's conduct constitutes
an unjustified violation of the Code of Conduct, but:
(1) the minimum requirements for liability contained in
Code of Adjudication Article 20 have not been satisfied, or
(2) the actor's conduct is excused under Code of Adjudica-
tion Article 22, then the verdict shall be "Not Guilty by Reason of
Blameless Violation."
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SECTION 413. VERDICT FoRM: NOT PUNISHABLE
If the trier of fact finds that the actor is not subject to prose-
cution, triable, or punishable because of a provision in Code of
Adjudication Article 23, then the verdict shall be "Not
Punishable."
SECTION 414. VERDICT FoRM: Guiury
If the trier of fact finds that the actor violated the Code of
Conduct without justification, satisfies the minimum require-
ments of liability under Code of Adjudication Article 20, and has
no defense under Code of Adjudication Articles 22 or 23, then
the verdict shall be "Guilty." The verdict shall indicate the grade
of the offense as provided by Part III of the Code of Adjudication.
Absent such a verdict system, trial verdicts can undercut and confuse
the public's understanding of the rules of conduct instead of clarify-
ing and reinforcing those rules, as trial verdicts ought to and can do.
IV. CONCLUSION
The drafting principles suggested in this Article are executed in
the draft code of conduct and draft code of adjudication contained in
the appendices. We do not suggest that these drafts are codes ready
for enactment They are, rather, vehicles by which we illustrate the
principles offered in the text. We have sought to take the majority
view on most policy issues in drafting these codes, not because we al-
ways agree with that view, but because we have sought to focus the
discussion on the drafting method rather than the drafts' contents.10 6
At least one writer has suggested that there might be value in
giving the members of the public rules to guide their conduct that are
different from the rules given adjudicators to assess liability, and that
the latter decision rules ought not be publicly available.' 0 7 The draft
codes that we offer here could well be used to construct such a system
of "acoustical separation." Some readers may think that such is part of
our motivation, so we feel obliged to address the issue.
There are arguments in favor of "acoustical separation" but on
balance we do not find them persuasive. A short-term value may re-
sult from the law's ability to announce a rule-perhaps denying a de-
fense to help deter crime, for example-but not to enforce the rule
and thereby avoid the unfairness to the defendant and the cost of
imprisonment. The long-term prospects of such deception are not
106 See also supra note 55.
107 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Crimi-
nal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625, 634-46, 667-68 (1984).
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good. In an open society with an active free press, acoustical separa-
tion cannot be maintained. And once the deception is revealed it can
only contribute to a cynicism and distrust for the criminal justice sys-
tem that will make it harder for the system to perform its functions.
A case in point is the once common practice of publicly imposing
long prison terms and then systematically releasing offenders long
before the end of the terms imposed. The practice provided high
deterrent effect at minimum cost. But once the practice was discov-
ered by the general public, the perceived bite of every imposed sen-
tence was reduced accordingly, requiring even higher sentences to
maintain the same deterrent effect. Of course, eventually the higher
sentences, also unfulfilled, only increased the public's discount rate
for judging the severity of the sentences imposed, creating a cycle of
exaggeration that often ended in sentences of many hundreds of years
being imposed, with little general deterrent effect because of a belief
by the public that the offender might still be released in a short time.
Many jurisdictions have shifted to a system of "real time" sentenc-
ing in which offenders must serve most of the sentence imposed. For
instance, the federal system requires an offender to serve eighty-five
percent of the sentence.'08 The earlier deception, however, has
caused many citizens to remain skeptical of the sentences. At the
same time, many people who have gotten used to high sentences insist
that the new "real time" sentences are too low to provide the bite
needed to deter. The earlier deception may have created the worst of
both worlds, longer sentences with less deterrence. Presumably, with
time, the system's credibility will return and people's expectations will
adjust.
Our view is that the code of adjudication ought to be available to
anyone who has an interest. Greater public knowledge of its contents
is likely to improve the criminal law's credibility (and provide better
prepared jurors). The emphasis, however, should be on broad publi-
cation of the code of conduct, for this is the document that should be
guiding people's daily lives. In the reasonably short and readable
form in which it appears in Appendix A, it can be widely reproduced,
read, and understood. It could be the basis for high school classes on
the obligations of citizens and for adult education and reeducation
through newspapers, magazines, and television. The resulting greater
public awareness and understanding can mean greater compliance
with the law's commands. And the better notice provided can make
more fair the punishment imposed for a violation of those commands.
108 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 8624(b) (1987).
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APPENDIX A. A DRAF'r CODE OF CONDUCT
Part I. Scope and Definitions
Section 1. Scope of Code
Section 2. Definitions
Part II. Specific Crimes: Prohibited and Required Conduct
Offenses Against Persons
Section 3. Injury to a Person
Section 4. Consent Defense to Minor Injury
Section 5. Consent Defined
Section 6. Assisting Another's Suicide
Section 7. Criminal Harassment
Section 8. Violation of Privacy
Section 9. Criminal Threat of Committing a Crime
Section 10. Criminal Threat of Exposure
Section 11. Criminal Threat of Official Action
Section 12. Criminal Restraint
Section 13. Welfare of Child
Section 14. Criminal Sexual Contact
Section 15. Sexual Contact Defined
Section 16. Intimate Parts Defined
Section 17. Indecent Exposure
Section 18. Public Place Defined
Section 19. Abortion
Offenses Against the Family
Section 20. Bigamy
Section 21. Interference with Custody
Section 22. Duty to Provide Support
Section 23. Incest
Offenses Against Property
Section 24. Damage to or Theft of Property
Section 25. Criminal Trespass
Section 26. Duty to Prevent Catastrophe
Section 27. Failure to Return Lost or Mistakenly Delivered
Property
Section 28. Forgery, Bad Checks, and Fraudulent Practices
Offenses Against Public Order or Decency
Section 29. Destruction or Damage of Certain Objects
Section 30. Disorderly Conduct
Section 31. Indecent Behavior
Section 32. Creating a Public Alarm or Panic
Section 33. Obstructing a Public Passage
Section 34. Prostitution
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Offenses Against Government Administration
Section 40. Obstruction of Law
Section 41. Avoiding Lawful Detention
Section 42. Failure to Appear
Section 43. Abuse of Non-Public Information by Public
Official
Section 44. Providing False Information
Section 45. Bribery and Criminal Compensation
Section 46. Governmental Oppression
Section 47. Tampering with Records
Section 48. Impersonating a Public Official
Part III. General Prohibitions
Section 49. Attempting Commission of a Crime
Section 50. Acting with Another Toward Commission of a
Crime (Complicity, Conspiracy, and
Solicitation)
Section 51. Creating a Prohibited Risk
Part IV. Justified Violations of the Criminal Law
Use of Deadly Defensive Force
Section 52. Use of Deadly Defensive Force
Section 53. Deadly Force Defined
Section 54. Unlawful Force Defined
Use of Non-Deadly Force by the General Public
Section 55. Use of Force in Self-Defense or Defense of
Another
Section 56. Defense of Property
Section 57. Use of Force to Prevent Commission of a Crime
Section 58. Use of Force to Assist Law Enforcement
Section 59. Use of Force to Prevent Suicide
Section 60. Use of Force to Pass a Wrongful Obstructor
Use of Force by Specially Authorized Persons
Section 61. Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officer
Section 62. Use of Force by Parent, Guardian, Teacher, or
Caretaker
Section 683. Use of Force by Penal Officer
Section 64. Use of Force by Operator of Public
Transportation
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Section 65. Use of Force by Medical Personnel
General Justifications
Section 66. Public Duty
Section 67. Lesser Evils
PART I. SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
1. SCOPE OF CODE
All crimes are defined in this Code. Other prohibitions, defined
by other statutes of this state, are not crimes.
2. DEFINITIONS
The following terms are defined in the following sections:
"Consent" in Section 5.
"Deadly force" in Section 53.
"Family member" in Section 23.
"Intimate parts" in Section 16.
"Property" in Section 24.
"Public place" in Section 18.
"Sexual act" in Section 35.
"Sexual contact" in Section 15.
"Unlawful force" in Section 54.
PART II. SPECIFIC CRIMES:
PROHIBITED AND REQUIRED CONDUCT
OFFENSES AGAINST PERSONS
3. INJURY TO A PERSON
You may not cause bodily injury or death to another person.
4. CONSENT DEFENSE TO MINOR INJURY
You may engage in conduct that causes or risks minor bodily in-
jury IF the victim requests or voluntarily consents to such conduct, as
in participation in a sporting event, for example.
5. CONSENT DEFINED
"Consent," as used in this Code, means voluntary agreement by a
person who understands the nature and consequences of what he or
she is agreeing to. Silence is not consent, unless such silence is under-
stood to be consent by prior agreement among the persons involved.
6. ASSISTING ANOTHER'S SUICIDE
You may not assist another's suicide, UNLESS the other:
(a) has a terminal illness,
AND
(b) voluntarily requests the assistance.
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7. CRIMINAL HARASSMENT
You may not repeatedly follow or contact another in a way that
causes the other emotional harm or the fear of physical harm.
8. VIOLATION OF PRIVACY
You may not violate another's legitimate expectation of privacy
without the other's consent.
9. CRIMINAL THREAT OF COMMITTING A CRIME
You may not gain an advantage from another by threatening to
commit a crime.
10. CRIMINAL THREAT OF ExPosuRE
You may not gain an advantage from another by threatening to:
(a) accuse anyone of a crime,
OR
(b) accuse anyone of serious misconduct,
OR
(c) expose a secret,
UNLESS you are trying to avoid a danger, right a wrong, or receive
restitution for the crime or misconduct.
11. CRIMINAL THREAT OF OFFICIAL ACTION
You may not gain an advantage from another by threatening to
improperly cause or prevent official action.
12. CRIMINAL RESTRAINT
You may not remove, restrain, or confine another without the
other's consent
13. WELFARE OF CHILD
You may not endanger the physical or emotional well-being of a
child.
14. CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONTACT
You may not have sexual contact with another person:
(a) without that person's consent,
OR
(b) who is under the age of eleven (11),
OR
(c) who is under the age of sixteen (16) if you are four or more
years older than that person,
OR
(d) who is in your custodial care,
OR
(e) who is receiving mental health treatment from you.
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15. SEXUAL CONTACT DEFINED
"Sexual contact," as used in this Code, includes any of the follow-
ing three types of contact:
(a) contact with another's intimate parts, using a body part, di-
rectly or through clothing,
AND
(b) contact with another, using an intimate part,
AND
(c) any form of sexual intercourse, using a body part or object.
16. INTIMATE PARTS DEFINED
"Intimate parts," as used in this Code, are the buttock, anus,
groin, scrotum, penis, vagina, pubic mound, or female breast.
17. INDECENT ExPosuRE
You may not expose your intimate parts in a public place, EX-
CEPT that if you are a female you may expose your breast as needed
to breast-feed a child.
18. PUBLIC PLACE DEFINED
"Public place," as used in this Code, is any area, facility, vehicle,
vessel, train, or aircraft to which persons generally have unrestricted
access or to which access is restricted to customers and employees.
19. ABORTION
You may not terminate a pregnancy after 26 weeks, UNLESS one
of the three following conditions applies:
(a) the failure to terminate would result in substantial and unjus-
tified danger to the life or health of the mother,
OR
(b) the fetus would be born with a serious physical or mental
defect,
OR
(c) the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.
OFFENSES AGAINST TIE FAMmy
20. BIGAMY
You may not marry another person if either of you is already mar-
ried to someone else who is alive.
21. INTERFERENCE WITH CUSTODY
You may not interfere with another's legal custody of a child.
22. DUTY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT
You must provide financial support to any present or former
spouse or family member or dependent when the support is required
by law or by a judgment of a court.
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23. INCEST
You may not marry or have sexual intercourse or sexual contact
with a family member. A family member is a parent by blood or adop-
tion, step-parent, child, step-child, brother, sister, uncle, aunt,
nephew, niece, grandparent, or grandchild.
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
24. DAMAGE TO OR THEFT OF PROPERTY
You may not damage, take, use, dispose of, or transfer another's
property without the other's consent. Property is anything of value,
including services offered for payment and access to recorded
information.
25. CRIMINAL TRESPASS
You may not enter or remain in another's building without con-
sent or enter or remain upon another's land if "no trespassing" signs
are posted or if you are told that such entrance is forbidden.
26. DUTY TO PREVENT CATASTROPHE
You must make reasonable efforts to prevent or reduce poten-
tially widespread injury or damage from explosion, fire, flood, ava-
lanche, collapse of building, release of other harmful or destructive
force or substance, or any other means, if you:
(a) have an official, contractual, or other legal duty to prevent
the injury or damage,
OR
(b) have contributed to creating the danger.
27. FAILURE TO RETURN LOST OR MISTAKENLY DELIVERED PROPERTY
You may not keep lost or mistakenly delivered property, UNLESS
you make a reasonable effort to find its owner and return the
property.
28. FORGERY, BAD CHECKS, AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES
You may not injure another person by providing misleading or
false information or documents.
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER OR DECENCY
29. DESTRUCTION OR DAMAGE OF CERTAIN OBJECTS
You may not damage, destroy, or deface any public monument or
structure, or any object or place commonly worshipped.
30. DISORDERLY CONDUCT
You may not provoke unlawful behavior or a disruption of order
in a public place or in a gathering of persons by excessively loud, of-
fensive, or threatening behavior.
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31. INDECENT BEHAVIOR
You may not commit a lewd and indecent act in a public place
that would cause offense or alarm.
32. CREATING A PUBLIC ALARM OR PANIC
You may not cause false alarm or panic among a gathering of
persons or among persons in a public place.
33. OBSTRUCTING A PUBLIC PASSAGE
You may not obstruct a public passage.
34. PROSTITUTION
You may not engage in, support, or profit from any sexual act
that is offered for sale.
35. SEXUAL ACT DEFINED
"Sexual act," as used in this Code, includes any of the following
acts:
(a) vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse or penetration,
OR
(b) direct genital stimulation.
36. OBSCENITY
You may not produce, possess, or exchange written or recorded
material that contains a visual record of any of the following:
(a) an actual sexual act involving a person under the age of six-
teen (16),
OR
(b) actual sexual contact between a person of any age and an
animal,
OR
(c) actual mutilation, torture, rape, or death of a human being
that is performed for such recording.
37. CRIMINAL POSSESSION
You may not possess:
(a) a weapon without proper authority or license, if such is re-
quired by law,
OR




38. CRUELTY TO ANIMALS
You may not cause unnecessary suffering, injury, or death to any
animal, UNLESS the conduct is specifically authorized by law.
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39. ABUSE OF CORPSE
You may not mutilate, destroy, or mistreat a human corpse, UN-
LESS the conduct is specifically authorized by law.
OFFENSES AGAINST GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
40. OBSTRUCTION OF LAW
You may not obstruct or resist an arrest, obstruct the apprehen-
sion or prosecution of a suspected criminal, or obstruct the perform-
ance of a public duty.
41. AVOIDING LAWFUL DETENTION
You may not escape from lawful detention, or fail to return to
lawful detention from authorized release.
42. FAILURE TO APPEAR
You may not fail to appear in court when required to do so.
43. ABUSE OF NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION BY PUBLIC OFFICIAL
If you are a public official, you may not speculate or wager upon,
gain an economic benefit from, or cause another to gain an economic
benefit from, information not available to the public gained in your
capacity as a public official.
44. PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION
You may not lie under oath or give false information to a law
enforcement officer, firefighter, or other public servant performing
his or her public duty.
45. BRIBERY AND CRIMINAL COMPENSATION
You may not offer or accept any benefit either to influence the
future action of or in return for past action by a public official or
servant, a party official, or a voter, UNLESS such benefit is a legal fee
or salary for such action.
46. GOVERNMENTAL OPPRESSION
If you are a public official, you may not violate another's per-
sonal, property, or other civil rights.
47. TAMPERING WITH RECORDS
You may not tamper with a public document.
48. IMPERSONATING A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
You may not impersonate a public official.
PART III. GENERAL PROHIBITIONS
49. ATTEMPTING COMMISSION OF A CRIME
You may not attempt to commit a crime.
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50. ACTING WITH ANOTHER TOWARD COMMISSION OF A CRIME (COM-
PLICITY, CONSPIRACY, AND SOLICITATION)
You may not agree with, ask, assist, or encourage another to com-
mit a crime.
51. CREATING A PROHIBITED RISK
You may not act in a way that creates a substantial and unjustified
risk of causing a result made criminal by this Code, EXCEPT that con-
duct creating a risk that would otherwise be a crime is not a crime if it
is:
(a) commonly engaged in,
AND
(b) generally thought by the community at large to be lawful.
PART IV. JusTIFIED VIOLATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
USE OF DEADLY DEFENsIVE FORCE
52. USE OF DEADLY DEFENSIVE FORCE
You may use deadly force against another who is threatening you
if and only if it is necessary to defend against the other's use or
threatened use of unlawful force likely to cause serious bodily injury
or death.
53. DEADLY FORCE DEFINED
"Deadly force," as used in this Code, is force that creates a sub-
stantial risk of causing the death of another person. The firing of a
firearm is deadly force.
54. UNLAWFUL FORCE DEFINED
"Unlawful force," as used in this Code, is force that would be
criminal and unjustified under this Code.
USE OF NON-DEADLY FORCE BY THE GENmiAL PUBLIC
55. USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE OR DEFENSE OF ANOTHER
You may use reasonable force against another if it is immediately
necessary to defend against the other's use or threatened use of un-
lawful force.
56. DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
You may use reasonable force against a person who is unlawfully
threatening property or who has just unlawfully taken property, if
such force is immediately necessary to defend or take back the
property.
57. USE OF FORCE TO PREVENT COMMISSION OF A CRIME
You may use reasonable force, including confinement, against an-
other, if it is necessary to prevent the other from acting in a way that is
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defined as criminal and unjustified by this Code.
58. USE OF FORCE TO ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT
You may use reasonable force against another if it is necessary to
assist a law enforcement officer in making an arrest or preventing an
escape.
59. USE OF FORCE TO PREVENT SUICIDE
You may use reasonable force against another if it is necessary to
prevent the other's suicide.
60. USE OF FORCE TO PASS A WRONGFUL OBSTRUCTOR
You may use reasonable force against another if it is necessary to
pass the person who is unlawfully obstructing a public passage.
USE OF FORCE BY SPECIALLY AuTHORzFD PERSONS
61. USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
If you are a law enforcement officer, you may use reasonable
force against another to make an arrest or prevent an escape. You
may use deadly force if and only if-
(a) the force used creates no risk of serious bodily injury to inno-
cent persons,
AND
(b) it is likely that the other person will cause serious bodily in-
jury if such force is not used.
62. USE OF FORCE BY PARENT, GUARDIAN, TEACHER, OR CARETAKER
If you are a parent, guardian, teacher, or caretaker, you may use
reasonable force against a minor or incompetent if:
(a) you are legally responsible for the minor or incompetent's
care or supervision,
AND
(b) such force is necessary to safeguard the well-being of the mi-
nor or incompetent.
63. USE OF FORCE BY PENAL OFFICER
If you are an official of ajail, prison, or other correctional institu-
tion, you may use reasonable force against an inmate if it is immedi-
ately necessary to maintain control or order within that institution.
64. USE OF FORCE BY OPERATOR OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
If you are responsible for the maintenance of safety, control, or
order aboard a vehicle, vessel, train, or aircraft, you may use reason-
able force if it is necessary to maintain such safety, control, or order.
65. USE OF FORCE BY MEDICAL PERSONNEL
If you are a doctor, a person acting under a doctor's supervision,
or a paramedic, you may use reasonable force if:
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(a) such force is necessary to avoid serious bodily injury or death,
AND
(b) no authorized person is available to consent,
AND




You may act in a way that would otherwise be a crime if your
conduct is necessary to perform a public duty, and reasonable in light
of the importance of that duty. This Section does not apply if the
situation is addressed by a previous section of this Part of the Code.
67. LESSER EviLs
You may act in a way that would otherwise be a crime if your
conduct is necessary to avoid a more serious harm or evil than that
caused by your conduct. This Section does not apply if the situation is
addressed by a previous section of this Part of the Code.
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APPENDIX B: A DRAFT CODE OF ADJUDICATION
Part I. Violation of Code of Conduct
Article 10. Violation of Code of Conduct
Section 100. Violation of Code of Conduct
Article 11. Provisions Relating to Adjudication of a Violation of
the Code of Conduct
Section 110. Causation Defined
Section 111. Requirements for Violation of Code of Con-
duct Section 49 (Attempting Commission of a
Crime)
Section 112. Requirements for Violation of Code of Con-
duct Section 50 (Acting with Another Toward
Commission of a Crime (Complicity, Conspir-
acy, and Solicitation))
Section 113. Requirements for Violation of Code of Con-
duct Section 51 (Creating a Prohibited Risk)
Section 114. Consent Defense
Part II. Liability Assessment
Article 20. Minimum Requirements for Liability
Section 200. Minimum Culpability Required
Section 201. De Minimis Violation
Article 21. Doctrines of Imputation
Section 210. Divergence Between Result Intended or Risked
and Actual Result
Section 211. Inculpatory Mistake
Section 212. Accountability for Conduct of Another
Section 213. Voluntary Intoxication
Article 22. Excuses
Section 220. Disability Excuse: Involuntary Conduct
Section 221. Disability Excuse: Insanity
Section 222. Disability Excuse: Involuntary Intoxication
Section 223. Disability Excuse: Immaturity
Section 224. Disability Excuse: Duress
Section 225. Disability Excuse: Impaired Consciousness
Section 226. Mistake Excuse: Mistake of Law
Section 227. Mistake Excuse: Mistake as to Justification
Section 228. Rebuttable Presumptions
Article 23. Nonexculpatory Defenses
Section 230. Timing of Assertion of Nonexculpatory
Defense
Section 231. Waiver of Nonexculpatory Defense
19961
ROBINSON, GREENE, & GOLDSTEIN
Section 232. Diplomatic Immunity
Section 233. Prosecution Barred by Former Prosecution
Section 234. Governmental Immunity
Section 235. Incompetency
Section 236. Period of Limitation for Commencement of
Prosecution
Section 237. Entrapment
Article 24. Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense
Section 240. Causing the Conditions of One's Own Justifica-
tion or Excuse Defense
Section 241. Causing the Conditions of One's Own
Nonexculpatory Defense
Part III. Grading
Article 30. Base Grade of Offense
Section 300. Grade of Offense
Section 301. Grade Levels
Section 302. Grade of Offense When Divergence Between
Result Intended or Risked and Actual Result
Section 303. Grade of Offense If Inculpatory Mistake
Section 304. Base Grade
Article 31. Adjustments to Base Grade
Section 310. Adjustment for Greater Culpability
Section 311. Adjustment According to Extent of Participa-
tion in Assisting an Offense by Another
Section 312. Adjustment for Ineffective Renunciation of At-
tempt, Conspiracy, or Solicitation
Section 313. Adjustment for Partial Disability
Section 314. Adjustment for Selection of Victim
Part IV. General Provisions
Article 40. Miscellaneous
Section 400. Principles of Construction
Section 401. Definitions
Section 402. Limitations on Convictions for Multiple
Offenses
Article 41. Verdict Forms
Section 410. Verdict Form: No Violation of Prohibitions or
Duties
Section 411. Verdict Form: Justified Violation of Prohibi-
tion or Duty
Section 412. Verdict Form: Blameless Violation
Section 413. Verdict Form: Not Punishable
Section 414. Verdict Form: Guilty
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PART I. VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT
ARTici 10. VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT
SECTION 100. VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT
A person violates the Code of Conduct, for the purposes of this
Code of Adjudication, if the person violates a prohibition or duty in
Part II of the Code of Conduct and does not have a justification for
such violation under Part IV of that Code.
ARTICr. 11. PROVISIONS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION OF A VIOLATION
OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT
SECTION 110. CAUSATION DEFINED
An actor is causally accountable for a result if.
(1) his or her conduct is an antecedent but for which the result
in question would not have occurred; and
(2) the result is not
(a) too remote or accidental in its manner of occurrence, or
(b) too dependent upon another's volitional act, to have a
just bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his or her
violation.
SECTION 111. REQUIREMENTS FOR VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT
SECTION 49 (ATTEMPTING COMMISSION OF A CRIME)
(1) An actor violates Code of Conduct Section 49 (Attempting
Commission of a Crime) if he or she engages in conduct that consti-
tutes a substantial step toward the commission of a violation which is
strongly corroborative of the actor's culpability.
(2) The following are examples of what constitutes a substantial
step:
(a) lying in wait, searching for, or following the contem-
plated victim of the violation;
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of
the violation to go to the place contemplated for its commission;
(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commis-
sion of the violation;
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle, or enclosure in
which it is contemplated that the violation will be committed;
(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commis-
sion of the violation, which are specially designed for such unlaw-
ful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under
the circumstances;
(f) possession, collection, or fabrication of materials to be
employed in the commission of the violation, at or near the place
contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collec-
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tion, or fabrication serves no lawful purpose under the circum-
stances; and
(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct consti-
tuting a violation.
(3) Liability for Attempt in Absence of Causation. Where an actor
would be liable for a violation of the Code of Conduct but does not
cause or is not causally accountable for the prohibited result under
Code of Adjudication Section 110 (Causation Defined), he or she is
liable for an attempt in violation of Code of Conduct Section 49 (At-
tempting Commission of a Crime).
(4) Complete and Voluntary Renunciation as a Defense to Attempt. An
actor may not be held liable for attempting a crime, in violation of
Code of Conduct Section 49 (Attempting Commission of a Crime), if
the actor completely and voluntarily renounces the attempt before
completion of the criminal conduct. An actor's renunciation is not
"complete and voluntary" if it is motivated in whole or in part by the
actor's:
(a) decision to postpone the conduct until a more advanta-
geous time,
(b) decision to transfer the criminal effort to another but
similar objective or victim, or
(c) perception of circumstances that increase the probability
of detection or apprehension.
SECTION 112. REQUIREMENTS FOR VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT
SECTION 50 (ACTING WITH ANOTHER TOWARD COMMISSION OF A CRIME
(COMPLICITY, CONSPIRACY, AND SOLICITATION))
(1) Unconvictable Perpetrator No Defense to Complicity. An actor may
be held to have assisted in a violation, in violation of Code of Conduct
Section 50 (Conspiracy), even if the person claimed to have commit-
ted the violation has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been con-
victed of a different violation or degree of violation, has an immunity
to prosecution or conviction, or has been acquitted.
(2) Termination as a Defense to Complicity. An actor does not vio-
late the prohibition against assisting a violation, contained in Code of
Conduct Section 50 (Conspiracy) if the actor terminates his or her
complicity prior to the completion of the criminal conduct, and:
(a) wholly deprives his or her complicity of its effectiveness
in assisting the criminal conduct,
(b) gives timely warning to law enforcement authorities, or
(c) otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commis-
sion of the violation.
(3) Sufficiency of Unilateral Act for Conspiracy. An actor may be
held to have agreed with another to commit a violation, in violation of
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Code of Conduct Section 50 (Conspiracy), even if the person with
whom the actor agrees is not in reality agreeing to commission of the
offense.
(4) Overt Act Requirement for Conspiracy. An actor does not violate
the prohibition against agreeing with another to commit a violation,
contained in Code of Conduct Section 50 (Conspiracy), unless one of
them performs an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. This re-
quirement does not apply if the object of the conspiracy has a base
grade in Section 304 (Base Grade) of a first or second degree felony.
(5) Complete and Voluntary Renunciation as a Defense to Conspiracy
and Solicitation. An actor may not be liable for agreeing with or solicit-
ing another to commit a violation, in violation of Code of Conduct
Section 50 (Conspiracy and Solicitation), if the actor prevents the
crime under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary re-
nunciation of his or her criminal purpose. A "complete and volun-
tary" renunciation has the meaning given in Section 111(4)
(Requirements for Violation of Code of Conduct Section 49 (Attempt-
ing Commission of a Crime)).
SECTION 113. REQUIREMENTS FOR VIOLATION OF CODE OF CONDUCT
SECTION 51 (CREATING A PROHIBITED RISK)
An actor violates Code of Conduct Section 51 (Creating a Prohib-
ited Risk) if, given the nature, degree, and circumstances of the risk,
its creation is a gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a law-
abiding person.
SECTION 114. CONSENT DEFENSE
An actor does not violate the Code of Conduct if the victim con-
sents and such consent:
(1) negates an element of the violation, or
(2) precludes occurrence of the harm sought to be prevented by
the Code of Conduct provision defining the violation.
PART II. LIABILITY ASSESSMENT
ARncLE 20. MhIMUM REQUIRmEwS FOR LnABHxry
SECTION 200. MINIMUM CULPABILITY REQUIRED
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is not criminal
unless the actor is at least reckless as to each element of the violation
as described in the Code of Conduct, except that negligence is the
minimum culpability required:
(a) for a violation of the prohibition against causing the
death of another person under Code of Conduct Section 3 (In-
jury to a Person); and
(b) as to the age of the victim for a violation of Code of Con-
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duct Section 14(b) or (c) (Criminal Sexual Contact).
(2) In addition to the culpability requirements of Subsection (1),
to be liable for a violation of:
(a) Code of Conduct Section 49 (Attempting Commission of
a Crime), the actor must have the purpose to engage in the con-
duct that would constitute the violation; and
(b) Code of Conduct Section 50 (Acting with Another To-
ward Commission of a Crime (Complicity, Conspiracy, and Solici-
tation)), the actor must have the purpose to facilitate the conduct
constituting the violation.
(3) Definitions. "Purposely," "recklessly," and "negligently" are
defined in Section 401 (Definitions).
SECTION 201. DE MINIMIS VIOLATION
An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is not criminal if the
actor's conduct is too trivial to warrant the condemnation of a crimi-
nal conviction.
ARTICLE 21. DoCTRrNs OF IMPUTATION
SECTION 210. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN RESULT INTENDED OR RISKED AND
ACTUAL RESULT
When causing a result is an element of an offense, and the actual
result differs from the result intended or risked by the actor, the re-
quired culpability as to causing the result is established if the differ-
ence is only that:
(1) a different person or property is injured, or
(2) the injury intended or risked would have been more serious
than the actual injury.
SECTION 211. INCULPATORY MISTAKE
Where an actor's ignorance or mistake negates the minimum cul-
pability required by Section 200 (Minimum Culpability Required), the
actor nonetheless is liable for the offense if he or she would be liable
for a different offense had the situation been as he or she supposed.
SECTION 212. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CONDUCT OF ANOTHER
(1) Legal Accountability. An actor is legally accountable for the
conduct of another constituting an offense if, acting with the mini-
mum culpability required for liability by Section 200 (Minimum Cul-
pability Required):
(a) he or she causes an innocent or irresponsible person to
engage in the conduct; or
(b) with knowledge that the other person is engaging in, or
will engage in, the conduct constituting the offense, he or she:
(i) aids, advises, or encourages the person,
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(ii) solicits the other person to engage in the conduct,
or
(iii) has a legal duty to prevent the conduct and fails to
make a reasonable effort to do so.
(2) Exceptions to Accountability for Conduct of Another. An actor is
not accountable for another's conduct under Subsection (1) if his or
her conduct is inevitably incident to the commission of the violation,
as a victim or otherwise, and is not prohibited by the Code of
Conduct
SECTION 213. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
(1) Where an actor does not have the minimum culpability re-
quired for liability by Section 200 (Minimum Culpability Required)
because the actor was voluntarily intoxicated, such lack of culpability
is immaterial if he or she is unaware of a risk of which he or she would
have been aware if sober.
(2) Definitions. For the purposes of this Section and Section 222
(Disability Excuse: Involuntary Intoxication):
(a) "intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical
capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the
body;
(b) "voluntarily intoxicated" means the actor's intoxication
was self-induced and not pathological;
(c) "self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by
substances, the tendency of which to cause intoxication the actor
knows or reasonably ought to know, that the actor knowingly in-
troduces into his or her body, unless he or she introduces them
pursuant to medical advice; and
(d) "pathological intoxication" means intoxication, grossly
excessive in degree given the amount of the intoxicant, to which
the actor does not know, and cannot reasonably be expected to
know, he or she is susceptible.
ARTca 22. ExcusEs
SECrhON 220. DisABimLry EXCUSE: INVOLUNTARY CONDUCT
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if the
actor's conduct constituting the violation is involuntary.
(2) "Involuntary Conduct" Defined. For the purposes of this Sec-
tion, conduct is "involuntary" if it is:
(a) not the product of the effort or determination of the ac-
tor, or
(b) a reflex or convulsion.
(3) Habitual Conduct Not Necessarily Involuntary. The fact that con-
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duct is habitual does not in itself make the conduct involuntary.
SECTION 221. DIsABILrry EXCUSE: INSANITY
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if, at
the time of the conduct constituting the violation, the actor:
(a) has a mental disease or defect, and
(b) by reason of such mental disease or defect, lacks substan-
tial capacity to:
(i) appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his or
her conduct, or
(ii) conform his or her conduct to the requirements of
law.
(2) "Mental Disease orDefect" Defined. For the purposes of this Sec-
tion and Section 235 (Incompetency), "mental disease or defect" is a
physiologically confirmable abnormality of the mind, but does not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise anti-social conduct.
SECTION 222. DisAILIry EXCUSE: INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if, at
the time of the conduct constituting the violation, the actor:
(a) is involuntarily intoxicated, and
(b) by reason of such involuntary intoxication, lacks substan-
tial capacity to:
(i) appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his or
her conduct, or
(ii) conform his or her conduct to the requirements of
law.
(2) "Involuntary Intoxication" and "Self-Induced Intoxication" De-
fined. "Involuntary intoxication" means the actor's intoxication was
not self-induced. "Self-induced intoxication" is defined in Section
213(2) (c) (Voluntary Intoxication).
SECTION 223. DISAILry EXCUSE: IMMATURITY
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if, at
the time of the conduct constituting the violation, the actor:
(a) is immature, and
(b) by reason of such immaturity, lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his or her
conduct.
(2) "Immaturity" Defined. For the purposes of this Section, "im-
maturity" means a level of maturity typical of an individual less than
sixteen years of age.
(3) Presumed Excuse for Actors Under Eleven. An actor of eleven
years of age or less at the time of the conduct constituting the viola-
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tion is presumed to satisfy the requirements of Subsection (1).
(4) Presumed Immaturity of Actors Under Sixteen. An actor more
than eleven years of age but less than sixteen years of age at the time
of the conduct constituting the violation is presumed to be immature
as required by Subsection (1) (a).
SECTION 224. DisABILiy EXCUSE: DURESS
An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if, at the
time of the conduct constituting the violation, the actor:
(1) was coerced to engage in the conduct by the use or
threatened use of unlawful force against his or her person or the per-
son of another, and
(2) a person of reasonable firmness in the actor's situation could
not reasonably have been expected to have resisted such coercion.
SECTION 225. DISABILITY EXCUSE: IMPAIRED CONSCIOUSNESS
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if, at
the time of the conduct constituting the violation, the actor:
(a) is in a state of impaired consciousness, and
(b) by reason of such impaired consciousness, lacks substan-
tial capacity to:
(i) appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his or
her conduct, or
(ii) conform his or her conduct to the requirements of
law.
(2) "State of Impaired Consciousness" Defined. For the purposes of
Subsection (1) (a), a "state of impaired consciousness" means a distur-
bance of consciousness resulting from a physiologically confirmable
state or condition not specifically recognized or rejected as a basis for
exculpation under any other Section in this Article.
(3) Presumed Impaired Consciousness. An actor who is unconscious,
asleep, or under hypnosis is presumed to be in a state of impaired
consciousness as required by Subsection (1) (a).
SECTION 226. MISTAKE EXCUSE: MISTAKE OF LAW
An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if, at the
time of the conduct constituting the violation, the actor reasonably
believes that the conduct does not constitute a violation because the
actor:
(1) reasonably relies upon an official statement of law contained
in a statute, judgment, or an administrative order or grant of permis-
sion, subsequently determined to be invalid or erroneous, or
(2) the actor diligently pursues all means available to ascertain
the meaning and application of the Code of Conduct provision to his
or her potential conduct and in good faith concludes that his or her
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conduct would not be a violation, in circumstances in which a reason-
able person would also so conclude.
(3) "Reasonable Belief" Defined. For the purposes of this Section, a
"reasonable belief" is a non-negligent belief. "Negligently" is defined
in Section 401 (4) (Definitions).
SECTION 227. MISTAKE EXCUSE: MISTAKE AS TO JUSTIFICATION
(1) An actor's violation of the Code of Conduct is excused if, at
the time of the conduct constituting the violation, the actor reason-
ably believes that the conduct constituting the violation is justified
under Part IV of the Code of Conduct.
(2) "Reasonable Belief" Defined. "Reasonable belief" is defined in
Section 226(3) (Mistake Excuse: Mistake of Law).
SECTION 228. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS
The presumptions afforded an actor in Section 223(3) and (4)
(Disability Excuse: Immaturity) and Section 225(3) (Disability Ex-
cuse: Impaired Consciousness) may be rebutted by the prosecution
by proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the actor is mature
or not in a state of impaired consciousness, respectively.
ARTICLE 23. NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSES
SECTION 230. TIMING OF ASSERTION OF NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSE
Any defense contained in this Article must be raised by the de-
fendant before trial. A failure to assert such a nonexculpatory defense
before trial shall be deemed a waiver of that defense, but shall not
preclude the defendant from raising any other appropriate defense.
SECTION 231. WAIVER OF NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSE
Where an actor would otherwise satisfy the requirements of a
nonexculpatory defense in this Article, the actor may elect to waive
the nonexculpatory defense in order to allow the trier of fact to reach
a verdict other than "Not Punishable" as provided in Section 413 (Ver-
dict Form: Not Punishable).
SECTION 232. DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
An actor may not be prosecuted for a violation of the Code of
Conduct if he or she has been granted immunity from prosecution
pursuant to the procedures of the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978.
SECTION 233. PROSECUTION BARRED BY FORMER PROSECUTION
(1) An actor may not be prosecuted for a violation of the Code
of Conduct if:
(a) he or she was previously prosecuted for a violation of the
same provision of the Code of Conduct;
(b) the present violation is based on the same facts; and
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(c) the previous prosecution:
(i) resulted in a conviction,
(ii) resulted in an acquittal,
(iii) was terminated after jeopardy attached, or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the
defendant, if the order or judgment necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a factual or legal proposition
required for conviction of the violation.
(2) Attachment offeopardy. The point in time at which 'Jeopardy
attached," as referred to in Subsection (1) (c) (iii), is defined by the
applicable Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SECTION 234. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
An actor may not be tried for a violation of the Code of Conduct
if he or she has judicial, legislative, or executive immunity from liabil-
ity for such violation.
SECTION 235. INCOMPETENCY
(1) An actor may not be tried for a violation of the Code of Con-
duct if, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the actor lacks the
capacity necessary to:
(a) understand the nature of the proceedings against him or
her, or
(b) adequately assist counsel in the preparation of a defense.
(2) "Mental Disease orDefect" Defined. "Mental disease or defect" is
defined in Section 221 (2) (Disability Excuse: Insanity).
SECTION 236. PERIOD OF LIMITATION FOR COMMENCEMENT OF
PROSECUTION
(1) An actor may not be tried for a violation of the Code of Con-
duct if:
(a) the violation is a misdemeanor or a petty misdemeanor
and the court determines that the conduct constituting the viola-
tion occurred more than three years prior to the date of com-
mencement of the prosecution, or
(b) the violation is a felony and the court determines that
the conduct occurred more than seven years prior to the date of
commencement of the prosecution, unless the conduct consti-
tutes a violation of Code of Conduct Section 3 (Injury to a Per-
son) that results in the death of another person.
(2) Commencement of Prosecution. For the purposes of this Section,
"commencement of the prosecution" can be achieved by any of the
following:
(a) return of an indictment,
(b) filing of an information, or
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(c) issuance of a warrant or other process, provided that
such warrant or process is executed without unreasonable delay.
SECTION 237. ENTRAPMENT
An actor may not be punished for a violation of the Code of Con-
duct if:
(1) the conduct constituting the violation is induced by a law en-
forcement officer,
(2) the actor was not predisposed to commit the violation, and
(3) the officer's conduct created a substantial risk that a reason-
able person not predisposed to commit the violation would have been
induced to do so.
ARTICLE 24. CAUSING TM CONI)MONS OF ONE'S OwN DEFENSE
SECTION 240. CAUSING THE CONDITIONS OF ONE'S OWN JUSTIFICATION
OR EXCUSE DEFENSE
(1) When an actor causes the conditions that give rise to ajustifi-
cation under Part IV of the Code of Conduct or to an excuse under
Article 22 of the Code of Adjudication, the actor gains the benefit of
the defense despite his or her conduct in causing the defense condi-
tions, but
(2) the actor may be held liable for the violation of the Code of
Conduct based upon his or her conduct in causing the defense condi-
tions if, at the time of causing those conditions, the actor has the cul-
pability as to bringing about the violation that is required by Section
200 (Minimum Culpability Required).
(3) As provided by Section 310 (Adjustment for Greater Culpa-
bility), the grade of liability for causing the defense conditions under
Subsection (2) increases if the actor was knowing or purposeful as to
causing the violation.
(4) Defense to Liability for Causing the Conditions of One's Own De-
fense. An actor may have a justification or excuse defense to liability
under Subsection (2) for his or her conduct in causing the defense
conditions.
SECTION 241. CAUSING THE CONDITIONS OF ONE'S OWN NON-
EXCULPATORY DEFENSE
When an actor establishes a nonexculpatory defense under Arti-
cle 23 and the actor caused the conditions of that defense, such de-
fense is not available to the actor. This Section is not intended to
supersede any international treaties.
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PART M. GRADING
ARICLE 30. BASE GRADE OF OFFENSE
SECTION 300. GRADE OF OFFENSE
The grade of an actor's offense shall be the base grade provided
in Section 304 (Base Grade), as adjusted by the provisions of Article
31.
SECTION 301. GRADE LEVELS
This Code recognizes:























PM (least serious offense)
SECTION 302. GRADE OF OFFENSE WHEN DIVERGENCE BETWEEN RESULT
INTENDED OR RISKED AND ACTUAL RESULT
Where an actor satisfies the requirements of Section 210 (Diver-
gence Between Result Intended or Risked and Actual Result) and the
grade of the offense for the result intended or risked by the actor's
conduct is lower than the grade of the offense actually committed, the
grade of the actor's offense is the grade of the offense for the result
intended or risked.
SECTION 303. GRADE OF OFFENSE IF INCULPATORY MISTAKE
Where an actor satisfies the requirements of Section 211 (Incul-
patory Mistake) and the grade of the offense under his or her mis-
taken belief is lower than the grade of the offense actually committed,
the grade of the actor's offense is the grade of the offense under his
or her mistaken belief.
SECTION 304. BASE GRADE
An offense has the base grade indicated below. Unless otherwise
provided, the grade given assumes a reckless violation.
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CODE OF CONDUCT SECTION ADDITIONAL GRADING CATEGORIES: BASE
VIOLATED: GRADE:
3. Injury to a Person (a) Death (negligently) F4
(b) Death (recklessly) F3
(c) Serious or permanent bodily injury F5
(d) Bodily injury Mi
6. Assisting Another's Neither (a) nor (b) F3
Suicide
(a) Terminal illness (but assistance not voluntarily F5
requested)
(b) Assistance voluntarily requested (but no F5
terminal illness)
7. Criminal Harassment M3
8. Violation of Privacy M4
9. Criminal Threat of (a) Threatens a felony F6
Committing a Crime
(b) Threatens a misdemeanor M2
10. Criminal Threat of M2
Exposure I
11. Criminal Threat of M2
Official Action
12. Criminal Restraint F5
13. Welfare of Child M1
14. Criminal Sexual (a) Sexual intercourse with a person under eleven F3
Contact years of age
(b) Sexual contact with a person under eleven F5
years of age
(c) Sexual intercourse without consent F5
(d) Sexual contact without consent M1
(e) Sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen F7
years of age if the actor is four or more years
older than the victim
(f) Sexual contact with a person under sixteen M2
years of age if the actor is four or more years
older than the victim
(g) Sexual intercourse with a person in the actor's F7
custodial or mental health care
(h) Sexual contact with a person in the actor's M2
custodial or mental health care
17. Indecent Exposure M4
19. Abortion F6
20. Bigamy M5
21. Interference with M2
Custody
22. Duty to Provide M4
Support
23. Incest F7
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CODE OF CONDUCr SECTION ADDITIONAL GRADING CATEcORiES: BASE
VIOLATED: GRADE:
24. Damage to or Theft of (a) Value of property damaged or stolen exceeds F3
Property $100,000
(b) Value of property greater than $10,000 and less F6
than or equal to $100,000
(c) Value of property greater than $1,000 and less F8
than or equal to $10,000
(d) Value of property greater than $500 and less MS
than or equal to $1,000
(e) Value of property greater than $100 and less M5
than or equal to $500
(f) Value of property less than or equal to $100 PM
25. Criminal Trespass (a) Dwelling or occupied structure M1
(b) Land PM
26. Duty to Prevent M3
Catastrophe
27. Failure to Return Lost M5
or Mistakenly Delivered
Property
28. Forgery, Bad Checks, M2
and Fraudulent
Practices
29. Destruction or Damage (a) Irreparable damage, destruction, or defacement M4
of Certain Objects
(b) Other M5
30. Disorderly Conduct PM
31. Indecent Behavior PM
32. Creating a Public M3
Alarm or Panic




37. Criminal Possession (a) Weapon M2
(b) Controlled substance
(c) Drug paraphernalia M5
(d) Stolen property Base grade of offense
according to scale used in
Section 24 (Damage to or
Theft of Property)
38. Cruelty to Animals M4
39. Abuse of Corpse M4
40. Obstruction of Law M3
41. Avoiding Lawful M3
Detention
42. Failure to Appear M5
43. Abuse of Non-Public M2
Information by Public
Official
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44. Providing False (a) If under oath F8
Information
(b) If not under oath MI




47. Tampering with M3
Records
48. Impersonating a Public M4
Official
49. Attempting Two grades less than the grade for the
Commission of a Crime completed offense
50. Acting with Another Grade adjusted as provided in Section 311
Toward Commission of (Adjustment According to Extent of
a Crime (Complicity, Participation in Assisting an Offense by
Conspiracy, and Another)
Solicitation)
51. Creating a Prohibited One grade less than the grade for the offense
Risk if the harm risked had resulted
* We follow the Model Penal Code's lead in not taking a position on the precise substances that
are to be controlled or on the appropriate grading for various drug-related crimes.
ARTICLE 31. ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE GRADE
SECTION 310. ADJUSTMENT FOR GREATER CULPABILIrY
(1) The grade of an offense increases:
(a) two grades if the actor is purposeful as to the core ele-
ments, and
(b) one grade if the actor is knowing as to the core
elements.
(2) Definitions. For the purposes of this Section:
(a) The "core elements" are those facts that establish the vio-
lation in the Code of Conduct and its grade in Section 304 (Base
Grade).
(b) "Purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently"
are defined in Section 401 (Definitions).
SECTION 311. ADJUSTMENT ACCORDING TO EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION IN
ASSISTING AN OFFENSE BY ANOTHER
Where the actor assists another to commit an offense, in violation
of Code of Conduct Section 50 (Acting with Another Toward Com-
mission of a Crime (Complicity)), the grade of the actor's offense:
(1) increases two grades if the actor is an organizer,
(2) increases one grade if the actor is a manager,
(3) is unaffected if the actor is a participant,
(4) decreases one grade if the actor is a supporter.
MAKING CRIMINAL CODES FUNCTIONAL
(5) Definitions. For the purposes of this Section:
(a) The actor is an "organizer" if he or she directed, super-
vised, or managed one or more persons who satisfy manager
criteria;
(b) The actor is a "manager" if he or she shared manage-
ment responsibilities on an equal basis with one or more actors in
any one of the following:
(i) the selection of the criminal objective,
(ii) the identification of resources necessary to achieve
the criminal objective, or
(iii) the planning, financing, or scheduling of the activi-
ties necessary to achieve the criminal objective;
(c) The actor is a "participant" if he or she was involved in
any way in the design or implementation of the conduct consti-
tuting the offense; and
(d) The actor is a "supporter" if he or she was a minor par-
ticipant in a criminal scheme and was to be compensated by a
fixed amount rather than a percentage of the profits of the crimi-
nal objective.
SECTION 312. ADJUSTMENT FOR INEFFECTIVE RENUNCIATION OF AT-
TEMPT, CONSPIRACY, OR SOLICITATION
(1) The grade of the actor's offense decreases one grade if the
actor completely and voluntarily renounces his or her attempt, con-
spiracy, or solicitation but is unable to prevent commission of the
offense.
(2) "Complete and Voluntary" Defined. A "complete and voluntary"
renunciation has the meaning given in Section 111 (4) (Requirements
for Violation of Code of Conduct Section 49).
SECTION 313. ADJUSTMENT FOR PARTIAL DISABILITY
The grade of the actor's offense decreases one grade if, at the
time of the conduct constituting the offense, the actor suffers a sub-
stantial impairment of cognitive or control function, as defined in a
provision in Article 22, but to a degree insufficient to merit a com-
plete excuse.
SECTION 314. ADJUSTMENT FOR SELECTION OF VICTIM
(1) The grade of the actor's offense increases one grade if the
actor selects the victim of the offense because the victim is:
(a) younger than sixteen years of age;
(b) older than sixty-five years of age;
(c) suffering from a physical or mental disability; or
(d) of a particular race, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual
orientation, or national origin, and by choosing the victim the
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actor hopes to intimidate or humiliate the other members of the
group of which the victim is a member.
(2) The grade increase provided by this Section does not apply if
the characteristic defined in Subsection (1) is an element of the
violation.
PART IV. GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 40. MscELLANEous
SECTION 400. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION
(1) Each term in the Code of Conduct and the Code of Adjudi-
cation shall be interpreted according to a definition provided for the
term or, if none is provided, shall be given its common and plain
meaning.
(2) Any remaining ambiguities shall be resolved to best further
the Code's goal of imposing liability according to the degree of an
actor's blameworthiness, including the degree of the actor's culpabil-
ity and the extent of any harm that results from the actor's conduct.
SECTION 401. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Code of Adjudication:
(1) A person acts "purposely" with respect to an element of a
violation when:
(a) if the element involves the nature of his or her conduct
or a result thereof, it is his or her conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result, and
(b) if the element involves the attendant circumstances of
the conduct, he or she is aware of the existence of such circum-
stances or he or she believes or hopes that they exist.
(2) A person acts "knowingly" with respect to an element of a
violation when:
(a) if the element involves the nature of his or her conduct
or the attendant circumstances, he or she is aware that his or her
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist, and
(b) if the element involves a result of his or her conduct, he
or she is aware that it is practically certain that his or her conduct
will cause such a result.
(3) A person acts "recklessly" with respect to an element of a vio-
lation when he or she consciously disregards a risk that the element
exists or will result from his or her conduct. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that, considering the purpose of the actor's con-
duct and the circumstances known to him or her, the actor's failure to
perceive it involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
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(4) A person acts "negligently" with respect to an element of a
violation when he or she should be aware of a risk that the element
exists or will result from his or her conduct. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that, considering the purpose of the actor's con-
duct and the circumstances known to him or her, the actor's failure to
perceive it involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
(5) "Element of an Offense" Defined. An "element of an offense"
means such:
(a) conduct,
(b) attendant circumstances, or
(c) a result of conduct, as is contained in the definition of a
violation.
(6) "Conduct" Defined. "Conduct" means a physical act or
omission.
(7) "Circumstance" Defined. "Circumstance" means a characteris-
tic of the conduct or a condition or environment under which the
conduct occurs.
(8) "Result" Defined. "Result" means a circumstance changed by
the conduct of the actor.
(9) Other Definitions. The following terms are defined in the fol-
lowing sections:
(a) In the Code of Conduct:
"Consent" in Section 5,
"Deadly force" in Section 53,
"Family member" in Section 23,
"Intimate parts" in Section 16,
"Property" in Section 24,
"Public place" in Section 18,
"Sexual act" in Section 35,
"Sexual contact" in Section 15, and
"Unlawful force" in Section 54.
(b) In this Code of Adjudication:
"Causation" in Section 110,
"Complete and voluntary" renunciation in Section 111 (4),
"Immaturity" in Section 223(2),
"Included offense" in Section 402(2),
"Intoxication" in Section 213(2) (a),
"Involuntary conduct" in Section 220(2),
"Involuntary intoxication" in Section 222(2),
"Manager" in Section 311(5) (b),
"Mental disease or defect" in Section 221(2),
"Organizer" in Section 311 (5) (a),
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"Participant" in Section 311 (5) (c),
"Pathological intoxication" in Section 213(2) (d),
"Reasonable belief" in Section 226(3),
"Self-induced intoxication" in Section 213(2) (c),
"State of impaired consciousness" in Section 225(2),
"Substantial step" in Section 111 (2),
"Supporter" in Section 311(5) (d), and
"Voluntarily intoxicated" in Section 213(2) (b).
SECTION 402. LIMITATIONS ON COisVICTIONS FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES
(1) When the same conduct of an actor satisfies the elements of
more than one offense, the actor may be held liable for each offense,
unless:
(a) one offense is included in another as defined in Subsec-
tion (2) of this Section, or
(b) inconsistent findings of fact are required to satisfy the
elements of the offenses.
(2) "Included Offense" Defined. For the purposes of this Section,
an offense is "included" in another if it consists of attempting, conspir-
ing, or soliciting the other.
ARTICLE 41. VERDICT FORMS
SECTION 410. VERDICT FORM: No VIOLATION OF PROHIBITIONS OR
DUTIES
If the trier of fact finds no violation of the prohibitions or duties
described in Parts II and III of the Code of Conduct, then the verdict
shall be "No Violation."
SECTION 411. VERDICT FORM: JUSTIFIED VIOLATION OF PROHIBITION OR
DuTy
If the trier of fact finds that the actor's conduct constitutes a vio-
lation of a prohibition or duty under Parts II or III of the Code of
Conduct, but finds that the violation is justified under Part IV of the
Code of Conduct, then the verdict shall be 'Justified Violation."
SECTION 412. VERDICT FORM: BLAMELESS VIOLATION
If the trier of fact finds that the actor's conduct constitutes an
unjustified violation of the Code of Conduct, but:
(1) the minimum requirements for liability contained in Code of
Adjudication Article 20 have not been satisfied, or
(2) the actor's conduct is excused under Code of Adjudication
Article 22, then the verdict shall be "Not Guilty by Reason of Blame-
less Violation."
SECTION 413. VERDICT FORM: NOT PUNISHABLE
If the trier of fact finds that the actor is not subject to prosecu-
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tion, triable, or punishable because of a provision in Code of Adjudi-
cation Article 23, then the verdict shall be "Not Punishable."
SECTION 414. VEPDIc-r FoRM: GUILTY
If the trier of fact finds that the actor violated the Code of Con-
duct without justification, satisfies the minimum requirements of lia-
bility under Code of Adjudication Article 20, and has no defense
under Code of Adjudication Articles 22 or 23, then the verdict shall be
"Guilty." The verdict shall indicate the grade of the offense as pro-
vided by Part III of the Code of Adjudication.
